

Social And Economic Life Of Uzbek Ssr (1925-1940)

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Abstract: In the article has been analyzed social and economic life of Uzbek SSR in 1925-1949 by the helping scientific literature and main sources and periodicals. Besides, in 1930–1932 alone, 638,131 collective farms were created in the republic through administrative oppression, open violence, economic pressure methods, and political repression, and the collectivization plan opened in the research as well.

Key words: Uzbek SSR, social life, economy, collectivization, industrialization, repression, agriculture, cotton monoculture, irrigation, demography, population.

INTRODUCTION

As a result of the "national-territorial demarcation" initiated by the Bolsheviks in 1924 - the deliberate division of the single territory of historical Turkestan into several political and administrative parts, the Uzbek SSR, Turkmen SSR, Kirghiz SSR, Kazakh SSR and Tajik SSR were created. Having solved the most important administrative problem, the Soviet government began an economic policy aimed at turning the Uzbek SSR into an agrarian and raw material base of the USSR. For these purposes, a "land and water reform" was carried out in stages, first in the Fergana, Samarkand, Tashkent (1925), then in the Zeravshan (1927) and in the Kashkadarya, Surkhandarya and Khorezm (1928-1929) regions. As a result, about 1.5 thousand farms of large landowners, traders and clergy were completely liquidated. More than 207 thousand dessiatines of irrigated land were transferred to the Soviet state fund, and only 10% of small farms received land, agricultural equipment and working animals. The irrigation system was completely transferred to state ownership.

RESEARCH METHODS

At the end of 1929, without having time to understand the essence of the "land and water reform", the population was forced to come to terms with yet another agrarian policy - mass collectivization. In January 1930, the Soviet government adopted a plan for the construction of collective farms, which served as a pretext for strengthening the command-administrative method of management. In the same year, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the USSR, based on the decision of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee "On the tasks of party organizations of Central Asia in the matter of mass collectivization and the elimination of the kulaks as a class", 17 districts were determined for complete collectivization in the Uzbek SSR. The basis for identifying kulak farms were lists of wealthy dehkans, individually subject to agricultural tax.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The lists were compiled by financial bodies and were often expanded to include middle and poor peasants. Thus, in 1930–1932 alone, 638,131 collective farms were created in the republic through administrative oppression, open violence, economic pressure methods, and political repression, and the collectivization plan was fulfilled by 75% [1]. Collectivization caused mass discontent, which manifested itself in the form of complaints, rallies, demonstrations, women's protests, as well as the sale, slaughter, or driving of livestock outside the republic. From January 1930, the discontent of the peasants grew into popular movements. Over two years, 400 mass demonstrations against the creation of collective farms took place in the Uzbek SSR alone, in which 91,180 people took part [2].

A significant number of dispossessed persons were resettled outside the republic, mainly to Siberia and Ukraine. Many were subjected to repression, sent to forced labor camps in the GULAG system. In 1930-1931 alone, 3,818 "kulak" households (17,775 people) were deported from 31 regions of the Uzbek SSR. In particular, 11 were sent to Kazakhstan, 3,807 to the North Caucasus and Ukraine. At the same time, 4,865 households (22,505 people) were forcibly resettled to labor settlements created within the republic [3]. The

most common form of repressive policy of the Soviet government during collectivization was the deprivation of voting rights of the population. Punished persons were dismissed from their positions, were not accepted into trade unions and collective farms. In addition, they were not given cards for goods and food products, they were not appointed to any positions, and children of kulaks were prohibited from being admitted to higher and secondary specialized educational institutions. The fight against the kulaks continued until the beginning of World War II. At the same time, a wave of political repression broke out in the USSR. Several high-profile political cases were fabricated in the Uzbek SSR, which were given the names: "the group of eighteen", "Inogamovism", "Kasymovism", "Badriddinovism", etc. As a result, many representatives of the national intelligentsia were arrested and repressed. By the spring of 1938, more than 60% of the management and business workers had been repressed. The arrests affected all social groups. Particular emphasis was placed on specialists who had received their education abroad, in particular, in Germany. They were accused of counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet, sabotage, espionage and terrorist activities. In violation of all legal norms, the accusation was based on only one type of evidence - the confession of the defendants. Such punitive policies made it possible to maintain ideological tension in society, directed against the slightest attempts at dissent, pluralism of opinions, and independence of judgment.

The Great Terror affected all spheres of life, including military affairs. Before the war, the 19th Uzbek Mountain Cavalry Division and the 21st Fergana Mountain Cavalry Division operated on the territory of the Uzbek SSR. During the years of the "Great Terror", part of the personnel of the 19th Uzbek Mountain Cavalry Division, led by the division commander Mirkomil Mirsharapov, was repressed. Among those accused of nationalism were 33 servicemen, including Sobir Rakhimov, who became the first Uzbek general during the war [4]. After a strict purge of professional personnel, in November 1940 the 19th Uzbek Mountain Cavalry Division had 4,049 personnel, including 382 officers, 603 junior officers, and 3,064 privates. The division was equipped with 2,912 combat horses, 600 artillery horses, 179 cart horses, as well as 8 passenger cars, 46 trucks, 26 special vehicles, 6 tractors, 6 motorcycles, 2,654 rifles and carbines; 100 light machine guns; 54 heavy machine guns; 6 45-mm guns, 32 76-mm mountain guns, 4 122-mm howitzers, 11 BT-5 tanks and 17 armored cars [5].

In addition, in 1937-1938, the best representatives of the Uzbek national intelligentsia were repressed and shot: Abdurauf Fitrat, Abdulhamid Chulpan, Abdulla Kadiri, Usman Nasir, Mannon Ramzi, Elbek, Ziya Said, Isakhan Ibrat, Pulat Saliev and others. For a quarter of a century, inspired campaigns against the "enemies of the people" were virtually continuous. The "troikas" of the NKVD of the Uzbek SSR arrested more than 100,000 people in the period 1925-1953, of whom 13,000 were shot, 1,700 were exiled from the republic [6].

The persecution of religion, the clergy and believers, a significant part of whom were also sent to concentration camps, caused profound damage to the spiritual culture of the people. The policy towards religion was intensified. Along with religious values, other spiritual values of the people were also ignored. The Soviet government tried to get rid of not only unwanted and harmful people, but also everything that was in any way connected with the previous life.

The language policy, associated with the accelerated transition of writing first to the Latin alphabet (1929), and then to the Cyrillic alphabet (1940), had a noticeable impact on the quality of the educational level of the population.

In general, the established colonial-totalitarian regime, trampling on the principles of humanism and democracy, through the repression of tens of thousands of people devoted to their Fatherland, exerted strong pressure on both the spiritual and socio-economic life of the Uzbek people.

According to the 1926 census, 5,273,000 people lived in the Uzbek SSR (4,445,726 souls of both sexes, excluding the population of the Tajik ASSR). Speaking about the employment of the population, it should be noted that 86% were involved in agriculture, 5% in handicrafts; 2.12% were employees of Soviet institutions; 2% were engaged in trade and credit operations, and 5% in other activities. At the same time, the population of the republic increased due to the deportation of various peoples to the region. Thus, on December 1, 1926, the Military Statistics Department of the Central Statistics Department of the USSR sent a secret telegram No. 77131 to the head of the Statistical Department of the Uzbek SSR, which gave instructions on compiling a list of the population, it was necessary to separately compile lists of regions with

a small number of families for the subsequent implementation of forced resettlement to these areas from various regions of the USSR of certain nations, as well as the placement of persons released from prison together with their families. Thus, in October – November 1937, 16,307 Korean families, comprising 74,500 people, were deported from the Far East to the Uzbek SSR [7].

Before the war, the economy of the Uzbek SSR had experienced two crises caused by the famines of 1920-1922 and 1932-1933. Moscow assigned the Uzbek SSR the status of a cotton raw material base for the USSR. A special program was developed to meet its needs for cotton. The area of cotton crops increased due to the reduction of grain and melon crops, orchards and vineyards. Thus, the republic gradually fell into grain dependence. The strengthening of the command-administrative system in the cotton policy of the Soviet state was clearly reflected in the activities of the Main Cotton Committee of the USSR. Since 1926, having again become a state monopoly on the cotton market, it single-handedly regulated the activities of a huge mass of peasant cotton growers. Contract agreements concluded with them each year acquired the force of a directive state assignment. At the same time, the cost of one pood of cotton remained low. On average, it amounted to 4 rubles 20 kopecks in the economic period of 1928-1929, while the average cost of a pood of wheat increased in 1925-1928 to 3 rubles 83 kopecks. As a result, many farmers openly declared their lack of interest in cotton cultivation, which led to the threat of being left without bread. At the same time, the supply of cotton growers with various industrial goods was extremely unsatisfactory. Thus, in 1926, only 34% of the total demand of the population was sold through the state trade system. In fact, agricultural machinery was not supplied to the village, as before; the main agricultural tools of the farmers were the omach (plow), hoe and shovel, and many farms did not even have this inventory. Relations between the state and collective farms and other farms began to be built not on a contractual basis, but on a system of state orders, which acted as strict planned tasks. In terms of fulfilling mandatory deliveries and delivering products in the order of state purchases, rural workers were practically put in the position of day laborers, finding themselves completely at the mercy of the state. In 1932, almost 90% of cotton fiber, more than 56% of vegetable oil, 42% of raw silk in the USSR were produced in the republic. The declared process of industrialization with the aim of strengthening the economic, technical and military potential of the USSR required significant material costs. Thus, according to a secret telegram dated March 26, 1926, No. US5, sent by the Chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR I. A. Rykov to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Uzbek SSR Faizulla Khodjaev, an order was given to prepare empty lands in sparsely populated regions for the construction of military bases. The required funds were to be covered by agricultural revenues. The tasks were to create agricultural engineering, implement irrigation construction, produce fertilizers, develop an agricultural processing industry, and also develop the mining industry. If on the eve of World War II, 31,850 factories, plants, not counting small manufactories and workshops, were operating on the territory of the RSFSR, Ukraine and Belarus, where 63% of all pre-war coal production, 68% of all cast iron smelting and 58% of steel, 60% of all aluminum production, as well as 38% of all pre-war gross grain production and 84% of sugar were produced [8]. Then in the Uzbek SSR, the factory and plant industry was in its infancy. Basically, these were small private handicraft-type productions. According to statistics, there were only 47 cotton ginning plants in the republic, compared to 199 in 1913. Only at the beginning of 1927 was the only textile factory in the republic opened. The gross industrial output of the Uzbek SSR in 1926 was estimated at 165.3 million rubles, or more precisely 1.6% of all USSR output. Of this, 92.8% was spent on processing agricultural raw materials, 5.6% on processing industrial raw materials, and 1.6% on the extractive industry [9]. Thus, in the Uzbek SSR, a small number of cotton processing plants and factories were opened.

In order to develop heavy industry, it was necessary to build a powerful energy complex. On April 28, 1932, the USSR Council of Labor and Defense approved the construction of the Chirchik Energy Complex consisting of two hydroelectric power plants, as well as a nitrogen fertilizer plant, which was to become the main consumer of electricity produced by the hydroelectric power plant. On September 30, 1940, the first hydroelectric unit of the Chirchik Hydroelectric Power Plant began operating, and the construction of the Chirchik Electrochemical Plant was completed. This was the main enterprise in Central Asia for the production of nitrogen fertilizers.

Further strengthening of the republic's production specialization as the main cotton base of the USSR, which dictated an acceleration in the pace of construction of irrigation systems for the development of new sown

lands. Thus, from August 1 to December 31, 1939, using the *hashar* method (nationwide construction without payment for labor), the Great Fergana Canal, more than 360 km long, was built in 45 days. The large irrigation canal passed through the territories of the Kirghiz SSR (12 km), the Uzbek SSR (283 km) and the Tajik SSR (62 km). During the construction, 245 tractors, 420 vehicles and 14 excavators were used to transport building materials, scoop, load and remove soil. However, the main means of construction was forced manual labor. The canal, opened on December 31, 1939, was the result of the hard work of more than 160 thousand collective farmers from the Uzbek SSR and 120 thousand from the Tajik SSR, who, using only hoes and shovels, dug out 18 million cubic meters of earth, stones, sand and clay [10].

In 1940-1941 The Northern Fergana Canal (160 km, 163 structures), the Southern Fergana Canal (120 km, 133 structures) and the Tashkent Canal (59 km with 41 structures) were completed ahead of schedule and put into operation using a similar method. As a result of the significant increase in the volume of irrigated land in the region, cotton sowing was increased. Before the war, the republic did not have its own fuel base. Coal was imported from the Kirghiz SSR. The discovery of the Angren deposit of high-calorie brown coal in the Tashkent region laid the foundation for the emergence of the coal industry. However, the development of coal, as well as the construction of irrigation structures, was carried out using the people's construction method. In various regions of the Uzbek SSR, about 30 coal deposits were discovered, the richest deposits of sulfur and ozokerite, copper, tungsten, molybdenum, etc. were discovered. However, the Uzbek SSR lagged significantly behind other union republics in industrial production per capita.

CONCLUSION

In general, the socio-economic life of the Uzbek SSR, like other union republics, was in difficult conditions, which were aggravated by the totalitarian policy of mass collectivization, industrialization and political repression. With large volumes of extractive industries, the share of manufacturing and machine-building in the structure of the economy was several times lower than the all-Union level. The industrialization policy was aimed at turning the republic into a large raw materials region, satisfying the needs of the industrially developed central regions of the USSR in non-ferrous and rare metals, minerals, cotton fiber and silk.

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