

The harbingers of breaching of the Abbasid Caliphate's symbolism during the dominance of foreign powers on the caliphate. Comparative Critical overview

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Abstract: This study explores a significant phenomenon characterized by the harbingers of the symbolic authority of the Abbasid Caliphate during periods of foreign dominance. It provides an analysis, critique, and comparison of the strategies employed by the Turkish, Buyids, and Seljuks, which contributed to the weakening of the caliphate. Throughout these three historical periods, the Abbasid Caliphate experienced profound vulnerability, as external forces marginalized their political significance, reducing their role to one of religious symbolism. Furthermore, the caliphs lost the sanctity and influence they once held during the prosperous and powerful days of Islamic rule, as this symbolic authority became shared with Seljuk officials. This research project seeks to bridge this gap by shedding light on the impact of foreign powers on Islamic authority within the context of the Abbasid caliphate during the Turkish, Buyids, and Seljuk eras.

Keywords: Abbasid Caliphate, Turkish period, Buyids era, Seljuk era, foreign powers, Islamic authority.

Introduction

This research employs the Abbasid state (132 – 656 AH) a historical framework attempting to trace down what the Abbasid Caliphate experienced during its four eras of domination endeavors by foreign forces. The research will present all attempts in a comparative critical manner based on the Barmakids' endeavors to interfere in caliphs' power in the Golden Age. This challenge had faced remarkable deterrence, presented by Caliph's power and caliphate's centralization, and all schemes went in vain. As opposed to what occurred in the subsequent eras, beginning with the period of Turkish's dominance (232-334 AH), the era of Buyids' (334-447 AH), and the era of Seljuk's (447-590 AH). The fact that the Abbasid caliphate was plagued by a severe weakness condition during these three periods and caliphs were exposed to vulnerability and underestimating by these outside forces, which made them completely lose their political symbolism and their role remained limited to religious symbolism. Worse still, the caliphs lost the sanctity and authority they had when governing the Islamic monarchy at a time of prosperity and power, because this symbolism was shared by both caliphs and the Seljuk officials.

This left the Abbasid caliphs in a truthfully difficult position, their tactic of utilizing foreigners (mercenaries) as a trump card to settle disputes and put an end to conflicts throughout these periods had not been successful because it was accompanied by unfavorable outcomes that violated the caliphate's symbolism and its sovereignty. The Abbasid caliphs' poor administration and their reliance on foreign elements brought them under their domination and enabled them to share their privileges and power. Since the foreign dominance forces had tightened their hold on power and influence, the caliphs were left with nothings but titles, and a privilege of praising them in religious speeches, and writing their names on coins. The indescribable reality that befell the caliphate's institution and the Caliph's symbolism inspired me to write this research as an academic attempt to trace down the implications of breaching the Abbasid Caliphate's symbolism during the period of foreign dominance on the caliphs, as an attempt to mark the beginning of that diminishment of the Caliph's political and religious status.

Reviewing the deteriorating condition of Abbasid's symbolism and power as foreign forces continue to exert influence over the caliphate's establishment and restrict the caliph's leading role. In fact, there is a striking resemblance in how these foreign powers—whether Turkish, Daylamite, or Persian—handled their stance on the caliphate. Except for a few formal differences, their positions remained same from an actual standpoint. The Abbasid caliphs had limited political and governing authority, no will, and minimal access to resources. Regardless of whether or not these foreign forces settled in Baghdad, used their power, sharing the same religious doctrine, title of commander of commanders in Baghdad. In addition to his religious symbolism,

which the caliph frequently threatened to use when there was growing pressure on him, he had no responsibilities other than overseeing his fiefdoms. This role varied relatively from one era to another, and with the continuing violation of the symbolism of the religious and political caliphate that the Abbasid caliphs had in the Golden Age, which was not restored until the fall of the Abbasid state in the year 656 AH.

The concept of Caliphate linguistically and legally (Islamic law)

The concept of Caliphate linguistically

The term "caliph", successor, refers to a person who succeeds another one, then, is a "standing-in" for someone who happens to have died, is ill or incapacitated⁽¹⁾. When a father dies, then, his son, take his place, he occasionally falls into the category the virtuous and the evil one. The caliph is someone who takes over the place of someone he occupies before him². It is said that so-and-so succeeds so-and-so if he was a successor, and it is said that I succeeded him i.e. taking over a place he occupies earlier³. The caliphate is a ruling authority, and it requires expertise in running the affairs of state⁴. The caliph is the supreme holder of power (sultan)⁵. Caliph holds the position of caliphate, being the successor of the Messenger of God (PBUH) in implementing the rulings of Sharia and presiding over Muslims in worldly and religion-related matters⁶.

The concept of Caliphate legally (Islamic law)

The caliph is the only person with the power to command, forbid, and administer both major and minor affairs of nation (umma). Furthermore, the Caliphate closely resembles a head of state position; according to ancient thinkers, scholars and philosophers' perspective. This position appears to have political features because the incumbent was expected to act as God's representative in both political and religious concerns of the subjects. No discernible distinction can be drawn between these two posts⁷. According to Ibn Khaldun, this position served as a symbol for upholding and enforcing God's law (Shariah) on earth, In general, the incumbent must meet the following requirements: he must be knowledgeable, just, competent, and completely sane, and its title varied between the caliphate and the imamate. The condition of Hashemite lineage, however, is a matter of debate⁸. Ibn Khaldun considered the post of Imam to be a religious obligation, given that the Companions of the Prophet of God, Muhammad bin Abdullah, (PBUH) pledged allegiance to Abu-Bakr and choose him to run their affairs. In order to prevent confusion, chaos and disputes, this continued throughout the remaining historical eras that came after the Rightly Guided Caliphate. He denies the appointment of the Imam as a necessity of reason and confirms that divine law is the basis for selecting the Caliph⁹.

The terms caliphate and imamate denote the same meaning among the Sunnis, and whoever assumes caliphate or imamate is called a caliph because he is the caliph of the Messenger of God (PBUH) and not God Almighty, as evidenced by Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq's saying, "I am not the caliph of God, but I am the caliph of the Messenger of God (peace be upon him), and caliphate is usually for the absent and not for the present"¹⁰. However, the Imami Shiites, they believe that the Imamate is (the position of a divinely-appointed leader) and one of the pillars of Islamic religion, and they assert that Imamate belongs to Imam Ali bin Abi Talib and to eleven infallible imams from his descendants, who were the direct designated successors of the Prophet, by Allah Almighty, based upon based on some Quranic verses and prophetic traditions.

Muslim Shiites believe that it is highly binding to appoint an Imam to act on behalf of the Prophet (PBUH), to succeed him in everything for which he was sent, to uphold the Islamic law, *Sharia*, and to ensure the continuation of the consequences of prophecy and its branches. They believe that the Imam is like a prophet, so appointing an Imam is obligatory¹¹.

The Shiite belief in the right of Imam Ali (peace be upon him) to the caliphate is based on the Holly Qur'an, due to his closeness to the Prophet (peace be upon him), his companionship with him, and his will to him, based on a set of Quranic verses that confirm this concern, including: *And warn, [O Muhammad], your closest kindred*¹². Another Quranic verse: *Your ally is none but Allah and [therefore] His Messenger and those who have believed - those who establish prayer and give zakat (charity), and they bow praying [in worship]*¹³. Another Quranic verse: *Say, [O Muhammad], "I do not ask you for this message any payment [but] only good will through kinship"*¹⁴. According to the consensus of Sunnis and Shiites, all of these verses were revealed about Imam Ali (peace be upon him). As a result, the Shiites vehemently rejected the caliphate (Imamate) of Abu Bakr and Omar when recognized by the Sunnis and accused them of denying Imam Ali (peace be upon him) and his eleven descendants from the legitimate right¹⁵.

Perhaps the difference in the perspective of Shiites and Sunnis regarding the right of those who succeed in the caliphate may have generated the beginning of division in the Islamic structure of nation. At a time, when the Sunnis and those who shared belief with them believed in the conformity between the caliphate and the imamate. They decided to pay allegiance to the caliph, Abu –Bakir, considering him a successor of the Messenger Mohammad (PBUH), and he would have leadership in issues related to religion and daily life throughout the historical eras of Islamic history until the fall of the Caliphate.

While the Shiites, who are the followers of Ali (peace be upon him) and his eleven descendants, they believe that the Imamate is not among the public interests that is delegated to the Islamic nation's personal opinions and tendencies. Moreover, it refers to a divine decree revealed to His messenger or His legitimate successor. They consider Imamate to be one of religion pillars and the foundation of Islam. More importantly, it is not permissible for a prophet to ignore it or delegate it to the Islamic nation. Rather, he must appoint the imam for them and be infallible from major and minor sins and Imam Ali (May Allah honor his face) is appointed by the prophet Mohammad (PBUH)¹⁶. Thus, the Shiites have a special stance committing themselves to follow their imams, whom they believe, have the legitimate right to succeed the Messenger (PBUH), and they have taken them as a political, spiritual and religious authority. Thus, Islamic authority has become apparently and officially, in the hands of the official caliph, who represents the leadership of the Islamic nation, but implicitly the leadership of the Shiites returns to their imam, who does not have an official status, but he represents a religious and political symbol among the Shiites, obligated to obey their imams. This represents two parallel lines in the history of two authorities throughout Islamic history, as Caliph's official authority goes hand in hand with the Twelver Shiites' spiritual authority. Excluding the period during which Imam Ali, then, his son Imam Al- Hassan, peace be upon them, represented the official power and the imamate, based upon the Shiites' standpoint, since they assumed the leadership of the Caliphate institution.

The history of origination of Caliphate concept, Caliph's prestige and his duties

The migration of the Prophet (peace be upon him) from Mecca to Medina in the year 11 AH marked the establishment of the first Islamic state, where he took Medina as a base for his emerging state⁽¹⁷⁾ and the Prophet (peace be upon him) had a great position among the Muslims, so his personality combined the spiritual and temporal authorities⁽¹⁸⁾. With the demise of the Messenger of God, the history of the caliphate began, with the establishment of the Rightly Guided Caliphs' Islamic state, which lasted until the year 41 AH¹⁹. The era of Rashidun Caliphate, the nature of management continued almost largely unchanged during this period, considering that the caliphate arose as a transitional phase after the demise of the Prophet (PBUH). The Rightly Guided Caliphs' prestige and status in leading the Islamic nation considerably resembled of the prophets'. The caliph had general guardianship over Muslim community and absolute obedience and he had the right to uphold their religion and supervise their worldly affairs. He was the prince of the people in peace, their commander at war, as well as their imam in prayer, their judge, and their jurist, just as the prophet had been²⁰. The honorable and prestigious position of the Caliph among Muslims is accompanied by important duties and responsibilities that must be performed by whoever assumes this post, including:

1. Safeguarding Islam religion in its original form, and to protect against the introduction of heresies into Islam
2. Establishing justice and enforce judgments (including punishments for crimes) and settle suits between litigants.
3. Ensuring protection of the lands and possessions of Muslim community, *al- ummah*, within the boundaries of the Muslim state, and they should feel secure enough to be productive.
4. Fortifying the frontiers, the physical boundaries of the Islamic state, with arms and other methods.
5. Be heavily involved personally in the acts of governing. The caliph must be actively checking and overseeing the duties of the government, and constantly be guarding against internal corruption.
6. Seeking out trustworthy men and selecting competent advisors for appointments, This especially applies to officials of *Bayt ul- Mal*, the State Treasury in an Islamic State in order to govern the Community best and to protect the Faith.
7. Supervising directly on Bayt-ul-Mal, in term of collecting and spending money and taxies, this process should be reasonable and be paid on time. thereby he would fulfill the duties God has assigned to him therefore he must be obeyed and supported²¹.

Some made seven duties of the caliph, which must be fulfilled, and if one of them was disturbed, then he would be disqualified and dethroned, namely:

(1) To Preserve religion and doctrine (2) To protect the lands and possessions of Islam Muslim community. (3) To evaluate gifts and what belongs to the Treasury without excess or laxity, and to make timely disbursements (4) To establish justice and enforce judgments. (5) To preserve the architectures of Islam nation. (6) To apply penalties and maintain God's prohibitions from being violated (7) To select honest and competent manpower.

Muslims also mentioned a set of qualities and traits that must be present and required of the prospective caliph, including:

1. Having the ability to create wellbeing and happiness for his subjects.
2. Free of physical impairments that would limit his mobility in his limbs and other body parts.
3. Having a clear comprehension of what is being conveyed to him, being aware of the teachings of the Holy Quran, and adhering to them.
4. Characterized of being highly remindful to everything he sees and hears and never forgets knowledge he acquires.
5. Prudence, wittiness and intelligent that ensures wise handling of the subjects and able maintenance of their interests
6. Wise, witty and intelligent, and if he notices even the smallest hint of something, he will be aware of it.
7. Passionate about acquiring knowledge without limits or bounds.
8. Inherently nature not affection, aligning to righteous and virtuous people, abhorring lying and hypocrisy.
9. Restraining himself from temptations and allures while abhorring their negative effects.
10. Dignified and nobleman, and to abstain himself from all dishonorable behavior.
11. Justice or probity with all.
12. To be as strong-willed as it should be, not frightened of death or weak-spirited.
13. A high level of integrity in financial and worldly matters.

According to Muslim theorists and scholars, these commendable characteristics and traits are the ideal ruler's traits necessary to whoever rules the Muslims. Furthermore, they highlighted that all of these characteristics must be met; if one is missing, he is disqualified and unfit²². In fact the Shiites compress all of these attributes to one that must be present in anyone who assumes power over the Muslim community, which is infallibility. That is, to be infallible²³.

The Umayyad state, which was metaphorically referred to as the Umayyad caliphate, when Imam Hassan bin Ali ibn Abi Talib (may Allah be pleased with him) abdicated the caliphate to Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan, this represented the end of the Rashidun era. With the latter's accession, the course of the caliphate concept was deviated by introduction of a new development in the government's system when Muawiya established hereditary monarchy akin to the state of the Romans, Persians and other nations. Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan had the influential figures and people swore allegiance to his son Yazid, and thus it became a tradition followed by all the Islamic state rulers later on²⁴. At a time when the Caliph was the temporal and spiritual ruler of the common Muslims before Muawiya accession, where his accession of power represented the end of spiritual authority in favor of temporal authority. In the year 41 AH, the caliphate turned into a hereditary monarchy in which the subjects had neither opinion nor say concerning approval or disapproval²⁵.

When Ibn Khaldun reviewed the stages of the Rightly Guided Caliphate and the rule of the Umayyad and Abbasids. He did not do justice to the truth, when considered the martyrdom of Imam Ali (may Allah be pleased with him) an apolitical transformation and the transition of the caliphate and the imamate into a monarchy. When the descendants of the Umayyad and the Abbasids assumed power. Ibn Khaldun also said: "Then the nature of monarchy required monopolization of glory and power, and Muawiya could not reject the power for himself and his own dynasty, naturally, he was driven by tribalism²⁶".

Here it is necessary to refer to the difference in Islamic sects and theological and philosophical doctrines in differentiating between the caliphate and the monarchy, although attitudes can be classified into three:

1. A number of scholars' attitude argued the caliphate had ended when Imam Ali bin Abi Talib was assassinated, based on the narrative reported from the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), "The caliphate of Prophecy will last thirty years; then there will be monarchy after that".
2. A number of scholars advocated the attitude, which considers, that force has become the underlying standard rather than rational consideration in the Islamic world, and that this force has generated a constitutional theory that appoints imam or caliph by force and election.
3. A number of scholars vigorously supported the concept of Majlis ash-Shura, or consultative assembly, of notable and trusted companions of prophet Muhammad. This approach was highly adopted during the era of the rightly guided caliphs, the second caliph, Umar Ibn Al-Khattab, strongly embraced this ruling system. This council or assembly functioned as one man, without designing House- Speaker, chairman²⁷.

Ibn Khaldun believes that the Rightly Guided Caliphs were appointed primarily in accordance with the Majlis ash-Shura principle, but that the situation altered under the era of Umayyads and Abbasids because they did not uphold and safeguard the tradition of their predecessors. He described this behaviour, "this had been the approach during the era of Muawiya, Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan ibn, and the earlier period of the Abbasid caliphate reaching to the reign of the caliph Harun al-Rashid and some of his sons. Since then, the matter has just been about dynasty-monarchy, and its symbolism has completely disappeared."²⁸

In fact, I agree with Ibn Khaldun in holding the Umayyads accountable for the caliphate's weakening, loss of prestigious status, and decline in power. Additionally, if we examine the differences among the three categories of Islamic sects and how they view the approach of assuming the caliphate. We will draw an important conclusion: this division can be used as a marker for the end of the era of power and power because it signifies the beginning of the decline in the caliph's symbolism and the status. Our adoption of this belief is predicated on an important observation and a fact that we take for granted: Each sect has adherents, and there is a faction of the Islamic nation that adheres to the doctrine that the caliph must assume the caliphate in accordance with their adopted standards. As a result, if a caliph assumed power in a different manner, position toward him would be rejection or lack of conviction, which would lead to complete disloyalty and opposition, or failure to acknowledge the caliph's sanctity status, which would lessen the significance of the caliph among Muslims as a whole. Particularly given to the fact that Muslim's power struggles were the impetus for the creation of political parties and factions, and it is evident that these disagreements over the ultimate ruling body (caliphate) in the Islamic state persisted throughout the Islamic era.

According to the consensus of the majority of Islamic scholars, there have been 73 different Islamic sects, and this makes evident the extent of the profound dispute that exists between them²⁹. We may envision how this division affected their perception of the Caliphate and the extent to which Caliph iconography varied among them. Once I imagine this dispute, it pushes me to adopt the idea that historical sources unanimously agree upon the fall of Baghdad and the end of the Abbasid Caliphate was in the month of Safar in 656 AH, but the actual fall of the caliphate institution had already been in decline for a very long time, that is, since the event of **Saqifa**, and the outbreak of disputes among Muslims after the demise of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and the rivalry among Muslims concerning who is the most eligible to occupy this post³⁰.

Caliph's privileges and the attempts to disrupt their symbolism in the first Abbasid era

The martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the grandson of Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon them, by Yazid ibn Mu'awiya ibn Abi Sufyan, also known as Yazid I, shocked the Islamic community and increased calls to overthrow the Umayyad Caliphate and restore the legitimacy of caliphate, represented by the Prophet Muhammad's households (PBUH). The Abbasids attempted to capitalize on this shock for their own interest. As a result, several bloody revolutions erupted against the Umayyads, who succeeded in suppressing them at first, but failed at their peak. When the pro- Abbasids, in most parts of the Umayyad state, especially in the Khorasan, Kufa, Basra, and Medina, set the foundations to overthrow the Umayyad state in the year 132 AH. The bottom line is that the Abbasids, by overthrowing the Umayyads state, restored the prestige of the religious caliphate³¹ by transferring power to them by virtue of their kinship with the prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the impact that had on its symbolism among the Muslims. Hence, Abbasid Caliph had a wide range of privileges and broad powers, undoubtedly, the first period of Abbasid rule was the golden age and characterized by absolute power and prosperity. The earlier Abbasid Caliphs were known for their political

savvy and prowess and their ability to keep tight ties with populations who supported them during the period leading up to the revolution against the Umayyad state. They also had an incredible capacity for suppressing the forces that were waiting in the shadows and striving to influence and power, with the exception of what happened in Andalusia and some regions in North Africa. The Abbasid caliphs' centralized rule and power during the first era allowed them to tighten their grip on the Islamic state and represented the prestigious status of the Islamic caliphate and its political and spiritual symbolism. This symbolism was reflected by a series of actions taken by the caliph alone, and not by any other person, such as praying and praising for him in mosque pulpits, printing his name on coins, and allocating a percentage of taxes to his own treasury³². In addition to his control over all financial, administrative, religious, political and military affairs of the state through his central administrative statement.

The first Abbasid era had begun from 132 to 232 AH and characterized by complete independence and the caliphs' tight grip over Islamic state. The first Abbasid caliphs had outstanding personal political and administrative abilities. The first prominent Abbasid caliphs of the golden age were Abu Al-Abbas al-Saffah, Abu Jaafar al-Mansur, Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah al-Mansur al-Mahdi, Abu Muhammad Musa ibn al-Mahdi al-Hadi, Harun Al-Rashid, and his sons: al-Amin, al-Ma'mun, al-Mu'tasim, and finally Abu Ja'far Harun ibn Muhammad al-Wathiq billah³³. The army was highly supportive to the Abbasid caliphate, they were an obedient tool in the hands of the caliphs, who led them personally.

Although we acknowledge the strength of this era, which has historically been called the Golden Age, we can notice some indicators of breaching the caliphate's symbolism, along with the beginnings of both administrative and political breakdown. From the year 170 to 187 AH, Harun Al-Rashid delegated his all-powerful wazir (minister), Yahya ibn Khalid ibn Barmak, to assume the administrative affairs in Abbasid state saying to him: "I've given you the power over the subjects, and I've transferred that authority from my neck to yours. Make the decisions you believe are right, and hire or fire anyone you think is suitable and proceed managing the administrative affairs as you please. This was the beginning of foreign domination and³⁴" interference in the affairs of the caliphate.

The Barmakids were a priestly family of Iranian origin, from the city of Balkh in Khorasan, where they were originally hereditary Buddhist leaders in the Nawbahar monastery, the name Barmak was not a name but a title of the high priest of the fire temple of the city. More importantly, we are in particular interested in discussing of the earliest interactions between the Barmakids and the Abbasid state as well as their leader Khalid Al-Barmak's conversion to Islam and his service in the Abbasid state under the reign of Abu Al-Abbas al-Saffah and Abu Jaafar al-Mansur. Besides, Yahya bin Khalid's rapidly growing power in the reign of Abd Allah al-Mansur al-Mahdi, his interactions with the lady, Al-Khayzuran bint Atta, was the wife of the Abbasid Caliph Al-Mahdi and mother of both Caliphs Al-Hadi and Harun al-Rashid. Moreover, his close relationship with her and her son Harun al-Rashid, as he became a tutor for Harun al-Rashid³⁵.

Rather, It is highly important to emphasize his plenipotentiary power over all affairs of government, as well as a free hand in hiring and firing personnel, during the reign of Harun Al-Rashid. Yahya was also awarded to be the Keeper of the Privy Seal, some sources reported that the Caliph handed over his seal in person, to symbolize the powers vested in his entrusted vizier (minister). Moreover, great privileges, power and highly confidential duties, which were exclusively restricted to Caliph Harun³⁶, were bestowed to this man. In fact, Harun Al-Rashid had breached Islamic caliphate norms when conceding a part of the exclusive and unsharable symbolism to Yahya bin Khalid. The Barmakids took advantage of this authority that Al-Rashid delegated to them. Yahya, along with his two sons, Al-Fadl and Jaafar, had widespread influence, to the point that Al-Rashid used to say to Yahya, "O my father, why do people call Al-Fadl the little minister not Jaafar? Yahya replied, 'Because Al-Fadl would succeed me'³⁷. This account revealed the extent of Yahya's power and influence over Harun Al-Rashid, because it was he who decided that his son would succeed him as minister, not the ruling caliph, who supposedly had unshared power to appoint ministers to government posts. Jaafar ibn Yahya Barmaki, also known as Abu al-Fadl, was immensely influential and had a close relationship with Harun Al-Rashid. The Abbasid caliph once used to call him "my brother". It appeared that Jaafar and Al-Rashid had considerably developed their relationship to the point they Jaafar was sharing the latter's power, authority, and privileges.

The best evidence demonstrating the tremendous power he once had, when a man called, Abd al-Malik ibn Salih ibn Ali, served as general and governor in Syria and Medina, visited Jaafar and requested to intercede

him to Harun Al-Rashid saying : “There is a discontent in the heart of the Commander of the Faithful toward me , I would like you ask him to be pleased with me” . Jaafar immediately said “ the Commander of the Faithful is pleased with you”, without even reporting the man's petition to the caliph. Moreover, the Abd al-Malik said: “I owe four thousand dirhams”. Jaafar said : “I can pay off you debt immediately , but I will have the Commander of the Faithful do it instead”. The man said: my son Ibrahim, “I would like to strengthen his back and be more powerful and secure by proposing to one of Caliph’s daughters ” . He said: The Commander of the Faithful has accepted you proposal. Finally Abd al-Malik said: “My son would like to hold a post in the government”. Jaafar said: “He will be appointed as governor of Egypt”. The following day, Harun Al-Rashid issued an official decree putting into practice what Jaafar had already told Abd al-Malik ibn Salih.

Even the historians are astounded with this behaviour due to Jaafar's growing influence over the powerful Abbasid Caliph ,in person. Surprisingly , Al-Rashid had granted this man more privileges restricted exclusively for him , such as judging the subjects' grievances and overseeing official correspondences .He also ordered that Jaafar’s name be engraved on coins in Madinat as-Salam (the City of Peace) , located in Bagdad , and in Mohammadiyah city, located in Persia . Despite our observation that Al-Rashid had given the Barmakids broader range of power, privileges and influence to the extent it appeared as a power- sharing. However, this does not imply that he had partially lost the caliphate's symbolism; rather, they were being under surveillance and surround by caliph's eyes, and when he realized that their presence had started to pose serious threat to him and was endangering the caliphate's political and religious symbolism. Therefore, all the powers previously given them were swiftly withdrawn and uprooted. This is an evidence to the Caliph's character and fortitude in reestablishing order and dealing with a problem that almost undermined his prestige and symbolism³⁸ . Consequently, the power of the Caliphate, its political and religious symbolism, and the Caliph’s influence remained the strongest in the first Abbasid era, despite the Barmakids’ attempt to disrupt it. The Caliph's ability to easily eliminate them can possibly be the clearest indication.

Undermining the caliphate's symbolism in the second Abbasid era (the era of Turkish domination)

Establishing of the Abbasid state was accompanied by major power rivalry between the Arabs and the Persians. Despite the Abbasids' achievement in reviving the religious caliphate's symbolism, they were unable to address this rivalry, which led to an imbalance in the political system that distinctly grew worse throughout Harun al-Rashid's rule (170–193 AH). Then, the caliphate's position further deteriorated when the Turks, the Buwayhids, and the Seljuks, took over religious and military positions when the Abbasid caliph , Abu al-Faḍl Jafar ibn Muḥammad, better known by his regnal name al-Mutawakkil ala Allah, ascends the throne , in 232 AH. It has been agreed to call it the Second Abbasid Era. Since then, the reins of power were handed over to powerless caliphs, the majority of whom ended up being killed, imprisoned, or deposed³⁹ . Ibn Khaldun referred to what occurred to the caliphate due to the foreigners' dominance and control by saying: However, when Quraysh 's power waned and its league fell apart as a result of the luxury and bliss they acquired and the vast fortune they spent in all regions of the world, they were unable to defend the Islamic caliphate, and foreigners prevailed and became immensely powerful across the Islamic monarchy’’⁴⁰ . Noticeably, when the caliph, al-Mutasim billah, become the ruler, failed to keep his predecessors' pace when allowing to Turks to join the army and relied primarily on them. Since his mother was of Turkish origin, she contributed significantly to establishing and bolstering their positions rather than establishing the caliphal government and army. Moreover, he widely employed Turkish servants, assigned important posts, and lavishly rewarded them.

However, I totally agree with Al-Douri's perceptive, who believes that the underlying reason prompting him to rely primarily on them was purely political, due to the imbalance of relationships in the Abbasid state. The relationship between the Persians and the Abbasids had worsened when the Abbasid Caliph , Al-Ma'mun , had decided to transfer the capital of the entire Islamic caliphate from Merv To Baghdad , Persian elites that had played a major role in the early period of the Abbasid state was increasingly marginalized. Moreover , killing of Abu -Abbas al-Fadl ibn Sahl , highly influential Persian vizier of the Abbasid era, had ended the Persian power in the Abbasid state and complicated reconciling interests among them , therefore Al-Mutasim resorted to establish more loyal and trustworthy army to defend him and his state. Besides, their large number in caliphal army and closeness to al-Mutasim billah was a resounding blow to the Arab commanders and soldiers⁴¹. The caliph did not rely on and trust them due to their frequent disloyalty and

incompliance to former caliphs. In addition to their loss of many of their political and military characteristics, which made them less unreliable and powerless⁴².

Given that the Persians, who were used by Al-Mutasim's predecessors, belonged to a civilized nation having its own systems and traditions that helped the Abbasids build their state in a valuable way, Al-Mutasim's choice to use the Turks was not related to logic and political wisdom. The Turks had a barbarous influence; therefore, they seldom promoted culture or thought⁴³. We considered, the Lebanese-American professor and scholar Philip K. Hitti, totally right when said "the increasing power of the Turkish soldiery marked the end of caliphal power⁴⁴". Al-Douri believes that Al-Mutasim, by recruiting the Turks in caliphal army and in various fields, undermined the pillars on which the Abbasid state was founded, namely the Persians and Arabs, and replaced them with a weak pillar, which was a new foreign element⁴⁵.

Ishaq bin Ibrahim precisely described this phenomenon when the Caliph, Al-Mutasim, complained to him about the Turkish officials' lack of nobility comparing to the Persians' nobility with Al-Ma'mun. He said, "Your brother, Al-Ma'mun, looked at the ascendants, so he used them and they produced descendants, and you, the Commander of the Faithful, used descendants that produce nothing, since they had no ascendants." He said, "O Ishaq, the suffering and pain I have been going through during this long period is more comfortable than your reply. The second Abbasid era was known as the era of Turkish domination, .⁴⁶" a result of great military shift occurring in the administrative approach in the Abbasid empire, when the Mutasim heavily relied and recruited a new cadre of Turkic and Central Asian troops. He brought them, in a various ways, from Transoxiana, such as Samarkand, Fergana, Ustrushana, and Khwarazm, such as Mamluks (slave soldiers), and becoming his entourage and innercircle, granting them unlimited power and highly influential military posts in each important part of his monarchy, and guarded himself by a new guard of foreign troops in favor of Arabs. In politics, Al-Mutasim settled Barmakids in Samarra, the new Islamic capital. The immediate motivation for the decision was a need to find housing for his newly formed Turkic and other foreign army regiments. Therefore, this age has become associated with their role and was called by their name⁴⁷.

What concerns us in this era is what their behaviour toward the caliphate's symbolism, religious prestige, and political position. Several underlying changes accompanied this period that greatly weakened the caliphate's value and position, as the Islamic state transformed from being centralized to decentralized. Moreover, fully and partially independent sovereign states had been established, but they recognized the spiritual power of Abbasid Sultan. The caliphs also lost the reverence and respect that their ancestors had in the first Abbasid era, due to enlisting new foreign elements (the Turks), falling under their influence, domination and prevalence in all aspects of the political scene. Some historians believe that the caliphate period of Al-Wathiq Billah, an Abbasid Caliph, reigned from 842 until 847 AD, was a transitional period between the first two eras, the first represented the Turks' control over the Abbasid state's affairs and revenues, while Islamic state's prestigious status were hardly maintained. The second represented the Turks' full control over the state and simultaneously the caliphs became as puppets in their hands.

The Turks' tightening control over Dar al-Khilafa, a presidential palace and government headquarter, led them consider the need to maintain control over the Caliph, in person, in order to maintain their dominance and authority because he is the source of that power. They thus resorted to actions that would undermine the Caliphate's Islamic symbolism and status; they took actions including placing him under surveillance and engaging in discussing political aspects. This was a prelude to taking the most influential step on the caliphate's revered symbolism and prestige, through intervention in selecting, designating, and enthroning Abbasid caliphs. Al-Wathiq Billah was last one caliph who was enthroned, based upon the previously followed traditions. The Turks succeeded in imposing their candidate, Jaafar bin Al-Mutasim, better known by his regnal name al-Mutawakkil ala Allah, to assume the power. This incident set a dangerous precedent in the enthroning the Abbasid caliphs later, as the Turkish officials became *ahl al-hal wal`aqd* (Those Who Have Binding Authority) until they were known as (the makers of the caliphs), none would assume this post unless he obtained their endorsement. This was reflected in the personality of the caliph, who lost his respect and reverence and was rendered helpless in the face of their tyranny. As a result, he lost the symbolism that prevents others from intruding upon or undermining his power. He occasionally faced numerous potential actions, such as assassination or dethronement, as the caliphs in this age frequently suffered from the Turk's dictatorial practices.

As it is historically recorded that the first occurrence of assault on the Abbasid Caliph was against Al-Mutawakkil when the Turks assassinated him, none of Abbasid Caliph had been assassinated before excluding, the caliph Al-Amin, killed by his brother, al-Ma'mun, after conflict over power. This terrible event served as a cautionary message to each Abbasid caliph, who desired to rise to power, telling them that he could either choose absolute loyalty and blind compliance or murder. As a result, they were referred to as the killers of Caliphs. The caliph no longer had the religious and political symbolism except a nominal power limited on engraving his name on coins⁴⁸. Based upon this development, al-Radi bi'llah tried to preserve the caliph's spiritual power by creating a new post called of Amir al-Umara ("commander of commanders") a military office that became the de facto ruler of what remained of the Caliphate.

The caliph, here, abdicated to those who assume this post the actual administration power, thus he lost his political symbolism and control over the command of the army and the state's financial administration. Later, this post exceeded all limits drawn to spiritual caliph by sharing other privileges such as praying and praising for him in religious speeches delivered in mosques and engraving his name on coins. In addition to other manifestations of hospitality and reverence, if we look at the matter, we will find that this step was not successful, especially since we know that the Caliph al-Radi bi'llah Radi, in person, was released from prison and then appointed Caliph. Therefore, his reform endeavor was not taken seriously by those who appointed him, The caliphs, al-Muttaqi Billah and al-Mustakfi Billah, were tortured and terrifyingly their eyes were gouged out despite the fact that they did not exercise any real power.

It was reported of the historian, al-Masudi said: "We have not addressed the ethics and attributes of the Abbasid caliphs, al-Muttaqi Billah and al-Mustakfi Billah and their doctrines, since they were as slaves, their order were never implemented" and nothing than this aspect can describe disrupting the Islamic caliphate's symbolism. The constant conflict over power and looting caliph presidential palace became normal and common behaviour, based allegedly on the prophetic tradition "*We, the prophets, do not leave any inheritance; whatever we leave is charity*"⁴⁹. Despite the deterioration afflicting the Abbasid caliphate's symbolism and prestigious status during in the era of Turkish authoritarianism and the Caliph fell under the clutches of the Turk's tightened grip and interference over his powers. However, it can be said, that he had some privileges inherited, since the establishment of the Abbasid Empire in 132 AH, included the legitimate right to appoint a minister aiding in administrating the state's affairs, holding sermons and spiritual mentorship in mosques, and engraving his name on coin. In addition to, the right to designate princes and judges, high-ranked leaders, preachers of mosques, and granting titles⁵⁰.

The symbolism of the caliphate in the era of Buyid domination

The Buyids originated from of Daylamite province, on the southern coasts of the Caspian Sea, the Buyids were descendants of Panah-Khusrow⁵¹. At the early fourth century AH, they surfaced in political field and established a confederation in Persia, Ahvaz, Kerman, Rai, Isfahan and Hamdan, and they extended their domination over Iraq, and shared the Abbasid caliphs in ruling the Islamic state and their influence maximized until their name remarkably dominated the Abbasid caliphate, which is called the Era of Buyids. The third Abbasid era, also known as the Era of the Buyids⁵², witnessed the Abbasid caliphate's great suffering from the Turks' expanding dominance and influence over the caliphate, as well as their concern of the growing Fatimid empire, which was at the height of its power. Therefore, the Abbasids were, in desperate need, to obtain support from the Buyids as being a promising powerful force from Zaydist sect. Obviously, their doctrinal difference with the Fatimid state was the primary reason prompting the Abbasids to consider them as an ally, to curb the the Fatimids' fast-growing expansion towards the Islamic East, in addition to their ability to end the Turks' domination over the Abbasid state.

Following the development of the Abbasid state throughout the Buyid era would make it abundantly evident that the Abbasids made a disastrous decision, and their appeal to the Buyids to protect the region from the Turks appeared just like "jumping from the frying pan into the fire"⁵³. The Buyid forces entered Baghdad without opposition, al-Mustakfi was forced to recognize the Buyids' authority and Ahmad ibn Buya was granted the title of Mu'izz al-Dawla ("Magnifier of the Dynasty). Twelve days later, they began their reign with acts of violence against the Caliph, Mustakfi Billah, disrupting his Islamic symbolism and sanctity when Mu'izz al-Dawla raided Dar al-Khilafa and ordered two of his guards to bring him and threw him to the ground and put his turban around his neck and driven to his palace. He was imprisoned and Dar al-Khilafa was totally looted. On the same day, Mu'izz al-Dawla appointed Faql ibn al-Muqtadir (al-Muti' li-

llah) as the caliph, the latter ordered to imprison and torture the dethroned caliph, al-Mustakfī, and his two eyes were gouged out and remained in prison until his death in 338 AH.

The historian, and biographer Ibn Al -Atheer described the state of the Abbasid caliphate by saying, "The caliphate's symbolism had constantly deteriorated and declined, and no power left behind at all, contrarily they were given orders regarding running the states' affairs. When Mu'izz al-Dawla seized the power, the caliph was stripped of all caliphal powers he used to have and became totally powerless. Rather, he had a katib (secretary) managing his fiefdoms only and Mu'izz al-Dawla became the de facto ruler and designated whoever he wanted" ⁵⁴. On one hand, one of the greatest reasons was that Daylamites belong to Zaydism, which is a branch of Shia Islam, despite to slight theological differences, in some views between them, they exaggerate in Shiism and exceed the reasonable bounds the religion has set. On other hand, they believe that the Abbasids had usurped the caliphate from the legitimate caliphs, Imam Ali and his decedents, therefore they did not have a religious motive that urged them to submit to the Abbasid caliphs. Despite I agree with Ibn al-Atheer when indicated to a state of weakness and humiliation in which the Abbasid Caliphate went through, but I disagree with him when trying to attribute it to doctrinal reasons, since the Buyids were Shiites. I adopted of Al- Karawi's view, in response to Ibn al-Atheer, when saying: "The Buyids are Shiites but they follow the Zaidi doctrine in which they grew up, and there is no regard for what Ibn al-Atheer says that they were from Shia sect exceed reasonable bounds "exaggerators" ⁵⁵.

Ibn Khaldun also described the status of the Abbasid Caliphate in the Buyid era by saying, "ailing had inflicted the Abbasid Caliphate and dominated by freed slaves" ⁵⁶. He refers to it as the "ailing caliphate"; this attribute reflects what the caliph had gone through as a result of the tyrannical policy when the Buyids seized all of the Caliph's possessions, authority, and treasury and allocated a daily salary of 5,000 dirhams that he did not regularly receive, then they stopped paying his allocations, and some fiefdoms were set to him live on. The most important development occurred in the Buyids' era lies when they decided that *Amir al-Umara* post is hereditary in the Buyid family and remained in the hands of their descendants until the year 447 AH. They even went beyond the limits of the Abbasid caliph's authority, which barred him from appointing a minister and allowed him only to have a secretary to oversee his affairs and fiefdoms, but Mu'izz al-Dawla also intervened in the appointment issue regarding who would be the caliph's secretary ⁵⁷.

Some historians contend that the Buyids' abuse of the Abbasid Caliphate was driven by sectarian animosity because the caliph was seen as the Sunni community's protector. In reality, I disagree with them, especially if we compare this treatment with that of the Turks and Seljuks. This will serve as our evidence that sectarianism has nothing to do with it, but it was a political motivation, and this represents the tyranny of the victorious strong towards the weak and defeated. Ibn al-Atheer therefore assumes that the Buyids lacked a religious motivation that would compel them to submit to the Abbasid caliphate and characterizes them as doctrine-exaggerators, forgetting that they are Shiites but adherents of Zaidi doctrine. Then, he seeks affirmation this claim by mentioning the attempt to transfer the caliphate from the Abbasids to the Alawites. When Mu'izz al-Dawla initiated to take this step, his close entourage advised him not to, saying: "Staying around the Abbasid caliph who your followers believe is ineligible of the caliphate is better than if they believed he is the legitimate one because this will threaten your political future, as soon as that caliph issues decrees or orders, all people would obeys him" ⁵⁸.

Despite the Buyids are Shiites adhering to Zaidi doctrine, but they believe that imamate is of interests of religion obligatory to apply the Islamic laws and a caliph could be selected even though he is not the most virtuous one and there were virtuous than him. More importantly, they do not believe in the infallibility of Imams, which is considered the most important matter in Twelver Shiites. Definitely, it greatly supports the idea that the Buyids' oppression and abuse of the Abbasid caliphs were not a sectarian approach. However, their belief justified the underlying reason behind leaving the Islamic caliphate in the hands of the Abbasids due to their belief that the appointed ruler had absolute power over the most virtuous people ⁵⁹, this view is considerably closer to the Abbasids' than the Shiites. This weakens Ibn Al Atheer's account in making their sectarian affiliation behind this attempt, and if it is true, it may be based upon political motives, they decided to keep the Abbasids in power allegedly, monopolizing, not publicly, all affairs of Islamic states, especially in presence of a powerless caliph whose decrees and orders are obeyed blindly by the Islamic nation.

Indeed, the Buyids, in the end, had not overthrown the Abbasid caliphate and disrupted its religious symbolism, despite they had all tools to conduct this action. The Abbasids remained ruling the Islamic nation and had only religious symbolism in appointing mosque imams, court judges, pilgrimage affairs officials, while they seized the political and symbolism power becoming the de facto caliphs⁶⁰. Abu Rayhan al-Biruni described the caliphate condition by saying: "the state and the sovereign had moved in the last days of Al-Muttaqi and the first days of Al-Mustakfi from the Abbasids to the Buyids and only religious symbolism had remained in their hand, not the de facto power⁶¹. Therefore, the Buyid officials were keen to show obedience and loyalty to the Abbasid caliph due to the religious influence he had as the supreme head of the Islamic nation⁶². There is no evidence of the Buyids' recognition of the Abbasid religious caliphate's symbolism especially when requesting to have power in granting or stripping titles to obtain the political legitimacy over the Islamic nation. Dr. Ahmed Amin affirmed this point by saying, "the caliphs' status in the Turks' era was highly similar to the Buyids', he had the greatest post, but no real power⁶³. The Buyids had not stopped in a certain level regarding confiscating Al-Abbasids' political power, but they went further when sharing emblems of Abbasid caliphate, which represented their symbolism and power. In their religious speeches, the Buyid high-ranking officials were lauded and glorified for their political endeavors alongside with the name of the Abbasid caliph. The drums were beaten on their doors, and their names were written on coins, this behavior had never happened before. It was reported that Muizz al-Dawla and his brother were the first leaders whose names were engraved on Islamic coin along with the Islamic Empire caliphs in Baghdad⁶⁴.

The Seljuks and sharing symbolism with the Abbasid Caliphate

The Seljuks were the descendants of Seljuk Bin Tuqaq, a powerful political leader and possessed great power and influence on Turkish state, and they originally belong to Turkish Oghuz tribes who converted to Sunni Islam. Tughril Beg was the grandson of Seljuk, He later established the Seljuk Sultanate after conquering Persia in 431 AH, when he defeated *sultan* Mas'ud I of Ghazni in the Battle of Dandanaqan, continued his expansion and became famous, and he won the recognition the Abbasid Caliph Al-Qa'im Billah recognized him as a Sultan in the year after the battle⁶⁵.

The establishment of the great Seljuk state was accompanied by important political developments suffered by the Abbasid Caliphate that helped to pave the way for their arrival in Baghdad. The most important of which was the danger of the Byzantine Empire, which regained its strength and left the defensive policy that it adhered to in the past three centuries to expansionary offensive policy in the Levantine and the island and the Arabian Peninsula. In addition to the danger of the Buyids who dominated the Abbasid Caliphate and confiscated its prestige, in addition to the suffering of the Caliph from the rebellion of his army commander Abu al-Harith al-Basasiri, who carried out a military movement that almost, dethroned the Abbasid Caliphate. These circumstances encouraged parties, the Caliph, and the Seljuks to reconcile their political interests. The Seljuks sought to gain legitimacy and blessing from the Abbasid Caliphate therefore, they offered homage and full support to the Caliph, al-Qaim bi-amri llah, he accepted their offer as a new emerging force has the ability to defeat the Buyids as well as the dangers surrounding the caliphate. He found his way in the Seljuks, especially since the Seljuks embraced the Sunni Islam which was an encouraging factor for him, who aimed to improve the entire affairs of the Sunni caliphate. He was very delighted of this homage message and took the initiative to send the Sunni jurist and the judges Abu al-Hasan al-Mawardi to Ray city and to gain their support of Seljuk Sultan Tughril Beg and request him to come to Iraq and reside in Baghdad.

Then correspondences between the two parties were continuing, after that al-Qaim bi-amri llah officially requested Sultan Tughril Beg to come to Baghdad. Apparently, the minister, Ibn al-Muslima, played a key role in persuading the caliph to take such a step, inclined to get the Seljuks' support due to his detest to the Buyids. Moreover, he told the caliph that "the Buyids are no longer capable to impose order and security throughout the Islamic Empire and the Seljuks are Sunni Muslims and have great respect and loyalty to the Sunni community". The arrival of the Seljuk forces in Baghdad in 447 AH marked the beginning of a new era known as the era of Seljuk dominance⁶⁶. The Caliph issued a royal decree ordering mosque imams to welcome the Seljuk forces with speeches in all of Baghdad's mosques and to praise their arrival as a support force for the Islamic Caliphate.

As much as we are interested in knowing whether the Seljuks' policy toward the Abbasid Caliphate differed from that of the Buyids, and whether the Caliph's belief that they would provide obedience and loyalty and

make great efforts to protect the Caliphate's symbolism was actually true or an illusion he was unaware of, it is not important in this regard to trace the Seljuks' origins or how they ended up in Baghdad. Despite the fact that the Zaidi Shiite Buyids and the Sunni Seljuks held different doctrines, it can be said that neither of these two foreign powers, the Buyids nor the Seljuks, used their doctrines to guide their policy toward the caliphate, respecting and upholding its political and religious status. In fact, one who closely examines historical events will discover that despite this difference, there are similarities in the way the Caliphate was undignified, its symbolism was disrupted, and its authority was neutralized.

The first thirteen months following the arrival of Tughril Beg was fairly prosperous and stable, he spared no effort to increase his influence and relationship with the Abbasid Caliph. In return, al-Qaim bi-amri llah also tried to strengthen bilateral ties in a number of areas, including his marriage, in 448 AH, to Khadija Arslan Khatun, a Seljuk princess and the daughter of Chaghri Beg, Tughril Beg's brother. The Seljuks' power and influence in Iraq increased because of the Abbasids and Seljuks' cordial reconciliation. The relationship, however, soon became strained and deteriorated when Tughril Beg conducted a systematic policy, which was more authoritarian than the Buyids, as he worked to monopolize the powers in Iraq, even those related to the caliph, as well as redirect Iraq's financial resources to the Seljuk treasury. It seems that the Seljuks had surpassed the Buyids in this matter.

Since Tughril Beg had made the decision to return to Al-Rai, he appointed a provincial governor (amid) to supervise Baghdad's affairs and an army commander (shuhnah) to maintain security. Both positions had greater power than the Caliph himself. Thus, he confiscated the political powers of the Caliph, in a manner similar to the Buyids, he thereby seized the Caliph's political authority. He went beyond the caliphate's tradition when proposing to the caliph's daughter, which was an attempt to get closer to the caliphate, the caliph was not pleased with this proposal, but he insisted on this matter through threats and intimidation and he married her in (455 AH)⁶⁷. It had never been reported that a foreign man had married into the Abbasid line, and although the caliph initially rejected the intermarriage, he was eventually persuaded to accept by threats and intimidation. He no longer even had control over his own family's affairs, which is a flagrant violation of the caliphate's symbolism and grandeur. Anyway, there was no fundamental change in the caliphate's circumstances under Seljuk rule, despite the fact that he publicly pledged his loyalty to the nation. Instead, they were no different from any other opportunistic foreign power motivated by its political aspirations. The caliph probably miscalculated once more, as it did with the Buyids before, believing that depending on foreign force would help in escaping their terrible plight⁶⁸. Things are more complicated if we trace the Seljuks' history and how they viewed their authority, in addition to the sultan's view of himself, the Seljuks believed in the theory of divine right (the divine right of kings) and this means that they believed that the idea that a monarch is chosen by God to rule his people. This also means that the sultan is the best of God as He made him a caliph to the His servants to act as he pleases.

This is what Sultan Alp Arslan mentioned when designating Nizam al-Mulk as a wazir and it seems that the Seljuks' perceptive to the Sultan threatened the caliph's religious symbolism, after he lost his political status he had to share his religious symbolism with them⁶⁹. This Seljuk ideology is thought to be a justification for their partnership with the Abbasid caliphs in their political and religious sovereignty, which made problems worse by leaving the Abbasid caliph with nothing more than his title. The caliph, in fact, became under their control from the moment he pleaded their assistance, as saviors; this power extended not just to the political but also to the caliph's status as a religious status in the Islamic world. The Abbasid Caliph's residence was regarded as a safe haven and protected sanctuary in all other ages; however, during the Seljuk authoritarian period, the Seljuks refused to uphold this right, when the caliph once sheltered some people. The Seljuks, who were known for their tribalism, disrespected sanctity of peoples' houses in Baghdad, which infuriated the Caliph and made him demand Tughril beg put an end to it⁷⁰. The Abbasid Caliph lived a difficult life during the era of Seljuk tyranny, in the face of their arrogance. For example, but not limited to, Sultan Malik Shah told the Caliph to leave Baghdad and go to any place he pleased so that he could make Isfahan as a new capital of Islamic empire to appoint his own daughter's son as Caliph, but the Sultan died before he could dethrone the Caliph⁷¹.

Despite the Seljuks' claim to respect and allegiance to the Abbasid Caliphate. However, the truth soon became clear by violating the sanctity of the caliphate and diminishing its prestige. This appears clear when Tughril Beg dispatched his minister to demand money from al-Qaim bi-amri llah while the Caliph was present at

memorial service for the daughter of Dhakhira al-Din Abu al-Abbas Muhammad bin al-Qaim, causing the Caliph to get enraged. One of the numerous abuses and acts of extortion committed by the sultan Tughril Beg was ordering state officials to confiscate the Caliph's money in Baghdad, Basra, and Wasit, when the latter refused to marry his daughter to him, but the situation changed after the Caliph's acceptance. In addition to these abuses of the Abbasid Caliph, the Seljuks also shared the Caliph's privileges. Tughril Beg ordered that when delivering religious sermons in mosques, he should mention his name along with the caliphs'. He also ordered that his title, the grand sultan, be engraved on coins, beating drums at his doors during the five prayer times⁷², which was regarded as a symbol of Abbasid sovereignty. Thus, we notice that the implications of disrupting of the Abbasid Caliphate's symbolism were similar to some extent, despite they belonged to different countries, Persian, the Buyids, or Turkish, but their attitude was almost similar towards the Abbasid Caliphate's sovereignty of, dignifying its prestige at times, and trying to change it or sharing its power and authority at other times.

Conclusion

Historically tracing the violation of the Abbasid Caliphate symbolism led to a set of results that can be summarized as follows:

1. The disagreement between Sunnis and Shiites over the caliphate generated the beginning of division in the body of the Islamic State.
2. Transforming the caliphate into a hereditary by Umayyads and those who came after them was the underlying reason for the loss of the Islamic caliphate's prestige and symbolism.
3. The research proved the harbingers of breaching the symbolism of the Abbasid political and religious caliphate and revealed the arbitrary policy of foreign domination power towards the Abbasid caliphs and its impact on the caliph's position in the leadership of the Islamic nation.
4. The research revealed attempts by foreign domination power, especially the Buyids and the Seljuks, to transfer the caliphate to non-Abbasids or to take over the Abbasid caliphate through intermarriage.
5. Although the Turks and Persian Daylamites varied in their origins and doctrines, they were similar in their approach to the caliphs by transgressing and weakening their political status.
6. The Turks, Buyids, and Seljuks stripped most of the privileges exclusively restricted to the Abbasid caliphs and shared these privileges with them with relative disparity between them.
7. The research revealed the Abbasid Caliphate's severe suffering as a result of foreign dominance, which was exactly the opposite of the aim that the Caliphate planned to use, and demonstrated their poor management in this regard.
8. The research revealed that there is no relationship to sectarian affiliation in directing the paths of foreign domination power in their approach towards the caliphate, but rather political interests and power rivalry.

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¹⁰ Ibid.,p 189

¹¹ Ghadbani, Saleh, The Caliphate end al Shia al athna ashariah , research published in the Journal of Academic Studies, Volume 5, Issue 1, 2023, pp. 29-31.

¹² Surah Al-Ma'idah , verse 214

¹³ Surah Al-Ma'idah , verse 55

¹⁴ Surah Ash-Shura, verse 23.

¹⁵ Ghadbani, al Caliphate eind al Shia al athna Asharia, p. 32

¹⁶ Ibn Khaldun, al-Muqadima , p. 194; Sabrina, Muhammad Belkacem, qira'a fi mafhum al khilafa w marjieiaat al fariq : muqarabat min tarikh al Asir al'iislamii," research published in Al-Hikma Journal of Historical Studies, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2021 AD, p. 128

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²¹ Sabrina, qira'a fi mafhum al khilafa , p. 130.

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²⁶ al- Muqaddimah p. 199 -205

²⁷ Abdel Qader Sahraoui, Caliphate and Imamate fi dhua Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun's, research published in the Journal of Islamic Civilization, Volume 17, Issue 28, p. 350.

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