

The Roles of some selected Institutions in democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, 1999-2021

Anyalebechi, Shammah. Mahakwe, PhD

Department of Political Science, Ignatius Ajuru University of Education, Port Harcourt, Nigeria

Abstract: Democracy as the most dominant political movement in the world today has been a worldwide trend over the years. In this regard, there has been an upsurge of international development agencies as important actors for democracy promotion, especially in developing countries, complimenting the efforts of other domestic democratic institutions such as INEC, political parties, Legislatures etc. Even though Nigeria has experienced over twenty years of uninterrupted democratic practice, there are still various challenges confronting Nigeria's democracy which has restrained it from consolidation. With secondary data, the paper examines the roles of some selected democratic institutions in consolidating democracy in Nigeria between, 1999-2021. It identified the problems that have militated against Nigeria's democratic sustainability in the past to include lack of proper democratic institutions. The paper concludes that for democracy to achieve its goals there is the need for change in the value orientation of the political elite. The argument is that no matter how sincere and determined a country or an international organization may be in its efforts to institute democratic rule in another country, its impact and influence "are largely conditional on opportunities presented by domestic developments," and, in most cases its efforts can only partially affect the outcomes of transitions." Where domestic conditions do not conduce to democracy, the efforts of an external actor could completely fail to make any impact. The paper therefore recommends that for democracy and democratic consolidation to thrive in the country, the war on corruption must be pursued with vigour. The ideological bases of our political parties that facilitate political vagrancy must be altered and in all the government must put in place measures to strengthen the nation's democratic institutions and intensify political education amongst politicians and citizens as precursor to good governance and development in Nigeria.

Keywords: Democracy, Democratic Consolidation, Democratic institutions.

Introduction

Since its political independence in 1960, Nigeria has had eleven general elections. Two elections were held in the First Republic, two in the Second Republic, one in the aborted Third Republic and six in the current Fourth Republic. The general elections conducted in the Fourth Republic include those of 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019. These elections were invariably controversial, raising deep concerns far and wide. While elections are very much domestic affairs of states, the multiplicity of the linkages and interconnections of globalization, in continuously inter-relating states and peoples, have increasingly made them international events with the advanced democratic states using the platform of international organizations to foster and promote democratic governance.

Following the democratic transitions of the late 1980s and early 1990s up to the end of the Cold War, democratic assistance became a key element of the foreign policies and development assistance programs of western nations. This has been particularly so in the case of the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom in the wake of "the third wave" of democratization in the world and the expansion of democracy that took place in Eastern Europe beginning in the mid-1970s and spreading to Latin America and parts of Asia in the 1980s. It accelerated dramatically from 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the unexpected surge of democratic openings in sub-Saharan Africa and further democratization in Asia. As dictatorships around the world fell and societies as diverse as Bolivia, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Malawi, Nigeria and others attempted transitions to democracy, the US, UK, EU and other major international partners engaging in democratic assistance frequently responded with needed support. Their democracy-related policies and programs have been prompted by the global shift towards democracy, more than the reverse, despite what all those involved in democracy promotion like to claim (Carothers, 1999).

In addition to the efforts of governments, multilateral organisations and a large number of national and international, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) renewed and expanded their commitments to international engagements in support of democracy. A consensus developed within the international community that considerations of national sovereignty should not shield a country's internal political arrangements from outside observation or criticism. Thus, not only did democracy emerge as a universal aspiration, norms also emerged in the international community indicating that it was legitimate to have an interest in promoting and supporting democracy abroad (Burnell, 2000)

Nevertheless, following the rapid growth of democracy in the 1990s, international donor agencies in collaboration with civil societies have been pushing for electoral support globally, especially in emerging democracies (Abdullahi, 2015). Nigeria has been receiving foreign democratic assistance since the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1999, running into hundreds of billions of dollars alongside non-monetary forms of assistance such as election observation and advising, organizing of training programmes for civil society groups, and promotion of civic education campaigns and so on through different international agencies (Bariledum, Godpower and Tambari, 2016, Anyalebechi, 2022) which are mainly from the US and other developed countries and their umbrella organizations.

But despite the multitude of competitive electoral cycles, from the 1999 democratization programme to date, donors have assisted Nigeria with hundreds of billions of dollars and with other non-monetary measures. Yet events in Nigeria have shown that elections can be intensely violent. In some contexts, democratic elections have failed to deliver increased stability and development, and in some other instances international assistance has even provoked a backlash against Western governments and organisations believed to be trying to control electoral outcomes. Also a range of evidence suggests that international support to democratic transitions often falls short of the desired standard and that elections alone cannot resolve deeper political and social problems besetting states. For instance, most donor support to civil society, the media and legislatures has gone to help them conduct key activities such as reporting, monitoring, training and observation of democratic processes including elections.

Although, there is still a consensus that democratic governance is fundamental to realizing critical human development goals, such as the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Thus as part of effort to address these lingering problems of democratization, with regard to some credibility and capacity gaps that exist in relation to elections in Nigeria, in recent times the donor community has chosen to continue to increase and deepen its support for its democratic processes, moving beyond the more short-term logic of electoral observation and support to incorporating more long-term substantive supports across a range of institutions and actors. Some of the major institutions that were targeted are the state and non-state actors, including the election management bodies (Independent National Electoral Commission- INEC, and Independent State Electoral Commission- ISEC), legislators, political parties, civil society organizations (CSOs) and so on. Therefore, the study seeks to examine the role of some selected institutions on democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

The Concept of Democracy

Democracy like other social science concepts suffers from the problem of definition. It is not the case that defining democracy is that problematic, but providing a universally acceptable meaning is always the challenge. Democracy is both a philosophy and a form of government. As a philosophy, it is an ideology of human society, , and way of political life, and a set of ideas and methods motivating and guiding the behavior of members of a society towards one another not only in their political affairs but also in their economic, social and cultural relationship as well (Rodee, Anderson & Christol, 1957, p. 83).

The term "Democracy" has been in use in the tradition of Western political thought since ancient times. It is derived from the Greek root, "demos", which means "the people"; "cracy" stands for "rule" or "government". However, there are several advocates of democracy who have treated democracy chiefly as a form of government. Austin (1832), Bryce (1921), Merrim (1939), Dicey (1885), Holden (1974), Appadorai (1968), Raphael (1976), Lowell (1884), Seeley (1896), Huntington (1970), Guy (1991), Pogonson (2010) and many more are some prominent supporters of this view. Bryce (1921), for instance, says that democracy is a government in which the will of majority of qualified citizen rules. Merrim (1939) describes it as not a set

of formula or blueprint of organization but a cast of thought and a mode of action directed towards the commonwealth as interpreted and directed by the common will.

For Lowell, democracy is only an experiment in government. Seeley describes it as government in which everyone has a share. Holden (1974) copiously describes democracy as a political system of which it can be said that the whole people positively or negatively make or are entitled to make or determine decisions on important matters of public policy. In his own view, Appadorai (1968:p137) conceives democracy in a simple way, stating that it is system of government under which people exercise the governing power either directly or through representatives periodically elected by themselves. The contemporary democracy, according to Raphael (1976), rests on representative government.

Democratic Consolidation.

Democratic consolidation is one concept that has attracted the attention of scholars and policy makers since the advent of the third wave of democratization. According to Aluaigba (2016:p138) democratic consolidation is construed as a stage in a country's democratic process where democracy acquires some characteristics of stability.

But, literally, the concept means an identifiable phase in the transition from authoritarian rule to civil rule and by extension, democratic systems that are germane and fundamental to the establishment and enthronelement of a stable, institutional and enduring democracy (Oni, 2014). Achieving democratic consolidation therefore calls for the enthronelement of democracy as a system of organizing both the society and government and thereafter creates concomitant institutions, culture, ethics, support system and the 'will' that are crucial in making it stable, efficient and responsive. Essentially, arriving at a consolidated democracy requires nurturing democratic values and ethos, principles and institutions in a matured sense that prevents a reversal to a hitherto authoritarian regime. It also rests upon a strong and dynamic civil society whose responsibility it is to check repeated abuses of power, hold public officials accountable for their actions and inactions in the management of public resources and also serves to mitigate political conflicts (Diamond 1994:7). Civil society is thus not an end in itself but a means to an end, as Diamond (1994) instructively noted that: a vibrant civil society is probably more essential for consolidating and maintaining democracy than for initiating it.

However, despite the nebulous nature of the concept, most scholars accept the original understanding of the concept as being associated with the challenge of securing and extending the life expectancy of new democracies, of building immunity against the threat of regression to authoritarianism and reverse waves (Schedler, 1998). In general there seems to be a return to the roots of consolidation in the sense of making democracy stable, and this should also be the understanding of this paper, but still one has to keep in mind that democratic consolidation and democratic deepening overlap and are not always easy to distinguish.

Besides the confusion about what consolidation exactly describes, there is furthermore no common understanding about when a democracy can be called consolidated. All in all two main streams have developed: one with minimalist definitions and another one with maximal definitions. Nearly all concepts can be grouped on a line between the extreme positions maximal and minimalist. There is disagreement on which institutions have to reach a consolidated status for the overall system to be consolidated; there is disagreement on the attitudes and behavior of different (key)-actors and on the way of how a state of consolidation can be achieved quickly.

The question that should at this juncture occupy one's mind is how do we identify a democracy that is consolidated? Nevertheless, different criteria are proposed in extant literature to identify a consolidated democratic system, but these few among others are discernible in this context. Just as many different types of authoritarian regimes and paths of transition exist, so do many roads to consolidation. Some of the authors cited in this section view democratic consolidation as a gradual process of overcoming the problems left by the previous authoritarian regime. Others argue that consolidation is the result of deliberate choices made by political actors. Although some authors are comfortable identifying a single endpoint of consolidation, others urge scholars and students to be wary of claims about what consolidation must include to be considered "complete."

In their important work, Linz and Stepan (1996) popularize the phrase "the only game in town" to describe democratic consolidation and outline how the history of a specific forms of authoritarianism might pose unique problems for consolidation. Linz and Stepan provide a good introduction to the different components of

consolidation, which they refer to as the five reinforcing “arenas” of consolidation: political institutions, the economy, rule of law, a usable bureaucracy and civil society. They also went further to offer a framework encompassing behavior and attitudinal and constitutional means of determining democratic consolidation. Behaviourally, there are no significant socio-economic, political, institutional or national actors trying to achieve their aims through unconstitutional means, violence or in attempt to secede from the state. Attitudinally, they argue that consolidation is achieved when a strong public opinion, privileges, democratic procedures and institution as the only appropriate means of governing. Constitutionally, in consolidated democracies, both government and non-state actors and social forces in the state become subjected to and abide by laws, procedure and sanctioned institutions for conflict resolution. Hence, although there may be severe problems of governance, and widespread dissatisfaction of the ruling government, the public and the elites uphold the belief and commitment to constitutional means as the only legitimate way to change a government (Linz and Stephan (1999, p.p5).

Although, Linz and Stephen (1997, p. 23) cited in Aluaigba (2016:p138) went further to outline two impediments to democratic consolidation. These are the threat of ethnic conflicts in multi-ethnic states, and the disenchantment by citizenry which arises from the inability of democratic regimes to deliver democratic dividends to improve the living conditions of the masses. This is precisely the case in the ‘third wave’ democracies, especially those that evolved in the 1990s in Africa – including Nigeria. In these countries, there has been growing disenchantment of the citizenry because of worsening social conditions of the people after more than a decade of the start of democracy. Democratic consolidation therefore means much more than mere existence of institutions and periodic elections.

Theoretical Framework

This study is essentially to assess the impact of foreign assistance on Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria’s Fourth republic, investigating the challenges faced by these agencies in the discharge of their functions. In order to ensure a systematic and logical explanation of the subject-matter, a theoretical anchorage is needed to serve as a guide to this research study. In this respect, this study adopts as its framework of analysis the theory of change by Anderson, a modification of Carol (1972) change model theory. This theory is simply an elegant theory of how and why an initiative works. A theory of change is a comprehensive description of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context. It does this by first identifying the desired long-term goals and then works back from these to identify all the conditions (outcomes) that must be in place (and how these relate to one another causally) for the goals to occur (International IDEA’s 2018–22 Strategy, Section 2 of Annex B).

Building on this, Anderson (2005) defines the theory of change approach to evaluation as a systematic study of the links between activities, outcomes and contexts of an initiative. Rogers (2008) writes, “A ‘theory of change’ explains how activities are understood to produce a series of results that contribute to achieving the final intended impacts. It can be developed for any level of intervention – an event, a project, a program, a policy, a strategy or an organization” (see UNICEF—Theory of Change). This suggests that a theory of change is a method for planning, monitoring, and evaluating initiatives in non-profit, philanthropic and government sectors. A theory of change articulates and graphically illustrates the assumptions that inform a change initiative, the prospective set of changes the initiative hopes to make, and the logical and chronological order in which causes and anticipated outcomes will occur. The theory of change ask that program planners, supporters, staff and, in some cases, participants outline the causal pathway between an initiative’s actions and its ultimate goals.

Typically, the theory of change includes an explanation of how and why anticipated changes will occur, rather than simply mapping the relationship among inputs, outputs and outcomes. Consequently, the theory of change is explanatory, while logic models are descriptive. Clark and Anderson (2004) argue that logic models “usually start with a program and illustrate its components” while “theory of change (work) best when starting with a goal, before deciding which programmatic approaches are needed “(For more information on the differences between the logic model and a theory of change, see Clark and Anderson’s “Theories of Change and Logic Models: Telling Them Apart”).

The basic assumptions of the theory of change include the supposition that the first step toward evaluating an initiative is to determine its intended outcomes, the activities it expects to implement to achieve those

outcomes, and the contextual factors that may have an effect on the implementation of activities and their potential to bring about the desired outcome.

Applied within the context of this study, it is to be observed in the broadest sense; major Western donors stress governance in their relations with developing countries, including Nigeria. They believe that “progress in the protection of human rights, good governance and democratization are fundamental for poverty reduction and sustainable development” (Diamond, 1995). Thus, democratic assistance is directed at achieving an objective (credible election) to bring about the desired outcome (development through good governance and democracy).

The above scenario depicts the Nigerian context where activities of the foreign donor agencies show that from the 1999 democratization process to date, donors have assisted Nigeria with hundreds of billions of dollars and with other non-monetary measures. Yet, very little exists or is shown to prove even the causal mechanisms linking the assistance and the result obtained. For instance, given the multitude of competitive electoral cycles concluded, events in Nigeria from 1999 till date have demonstrated that elections can be intensely violent and in-transparent. This has been shown in several occurrences such as electoral violence, prevalence of moneybags, manipulations, godfatherism, clientelism and so on, all of which negate the value of conducting free and fair elections leading to distortion in their outcomes and further engendering public discontent about the quality and credibility of elections in Nigeria.

The situation is further exacerbated by: (a) the involvement of political parties’ that are devoid of ideology which invariably resort to electoral campaigns that revolve around ethno-religious cleavages and personality-based politics, coupled with lack of commitment to democracy and accountability both within their own structures and in the manner they engage with the electoral process; (b) institutions responsible for and managing elections both at federal and local levels that lack structural and operational autonomy which is critical for the conduct of credible, transparent and peaceful elections; (c) the judiciary in Nigeria which has been widely criticized for lack of independence and slow adjudication of electoral disputes, leading to cases being delayed for years after the end of elections; (d) the fact that though civil society and the media in Nigeria have played a pivotal role in advocating for democratic reforms over the years--and have done so successfully - these sector remain largely urban-based and somewhat elitist; (e) the patriarchal system which continues to weaken the role of women and other vulnerable groups in politics and elections.

The adoption of the theory of change in this study is informed by its aptness in providing a systematic explanation of the basic variables that this study interrogates. A theory of change approach to planning and evaluation is increasingly being considered an essential practice for many organisations, programmes and projects. The theory of change can be developed in many different ways but there are often common elements. These include an articulation of how change happens in a particular context, clarification of an organisation and its partners’ roles in contributing to change, and the definition and testing of critical assumptions. Development is a result-driven sector. Those involved in delivering development projects are accountable to a range of stakeholders, including the people directly affected – primary stakeholders or beneficiaries – as well as partners, donors and groups within their own organisations. A rigorous approach to a development problem involves critical analysis of all of the key steps that must take place in order to achieve the desired social change.

It should, however, be noted that the theory of change has been faulted by some scholars. According to them, the typical theory of change, as set out in many accounts, risks being misleading in two important ways. The first criticism is that they tend to be too linear, assuming that inputs lead to outputs and that outputs lead to outcomes. This sometimes happens. But anyone familiar with systems thinking will be doubtful of linear explanations, especially where complex social phenomena like homelessness, election, poverty or isolation and so on are concerned. The second criticism is that theories of change risk squeezing out space for learning. Several authors have mentioned that critical reflection, which is vital to double-loop learning, can be dampened by the over-prescription of new approaches, such as the use of theories of change (Allana, 2014; O’Keefe, Marquette, Roche, Hudson & Dasandi, 2014). Difficulties may arise due to the tension between being accountable to donors, on the one hand, (often seen as a priority in terms of the results-based agenda) and learning from our work.

Despite these inadequacies, the theory (responding to demands from member states and donors) is still considered very relevant for the purpose of analysis in this study. On the other hand, the theory of change

approach to foreign democratic assistance rendered to Nigeria is useful as an attempt to evaluate donor initiatives so as to determine their intended outcomes, the activities expected to be implemented to achieve those outcomes, and the contextual factors that may have an effect on the implementation of activities along with their potential to bring about the desired outcome. This theory encourages deep observation of the system – how power is distributed; how decisions are made, what are the coalitions for and against any given change, how is change likely to happen in this system.

It helps in identifying and opening up the ‘black boxes’ in our thinking – intellectual leaps and assumptions, like the discussions on democratic donor agencies in their initial assumption that democratic assistance is directed at achieving an objective (credible election) to bring about the desired outcome (development through good governance and democracy). It will enable institutions, organizations or nations to more effectively target their interventions by guiding the work and enhancing the policy impact involved. Therefore, the theory helps to practically map the change process and its expected outcomes while facilitating project implementation, articulating expected processes and outcomes that can be reviewed over time and communicating the chosen change process to internal and external partners.

Above all, this theory of change approach will therefore enhance scientific understanding and stand as operational tools to further assess the activities of democratic donor agencies in Nigeria as this will facilitate the examination of the activities that reveal its impact towards democratic consolidation in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, its level and compliance from 1999 to 2019 with the objectives of foreign assistance for deepening Democracy practice in Nigeria and investigating the challenges faced by these agencies in the discharge of their functions.

Consequently, the research posits that what negate democratic consolidation in Nigeria is not with the activities of foreign donors but the failure of the actors to abide by the norms of democratic governance. As a corollary to this reality, therefore, the study asserts that the antidote to the prevailing stalemate is strict adherence by all politically relevant strata of the Nigerian state to the universally acclaimed of democratic governance.

The Roles of selected Nigeria’s Institutions in democratic Consolidation in Nigeria

1). Independent Electoral Commission (INEC)

Apart from the colonial and the military institutions, the electoral process is also an element to be reckoned with in the democratization bid of Nigeria. Electoral bodies, since independence, have considerable roles in the democratic project of the country. Ibrahim and Garuba (2008) have traced the democratic direction of electoral management body from the post-independence federal Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) to Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) in 1976, replaced by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) in 1987. In 1993, NEC was replaced with the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON). All the elections it conducted into councils, states and federal legislatures were described as highly ineffective and inefficient (Aderemi, 2005). It was the regime of Abdulsalami Abubakar who restructured the electoral body and named it Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) which conducted elections from 1999 to 2019.

The importance of INEC can not be overestimated. Over the years, there has been the clamour for credible elections all over the world to pave the way for a sound democratic process. Particularly in the African continent, leaders found it difficult to relinquish power so as to encourage greater citizens participation. Be that as it may, INEC is the institution set up according to the provision in Section 153 (1) f (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with the sole power to conduct all elections to public offices in the country.

Therefore, INEC is the body in charge of managing the federal and state elections. It is the key mechanism involved in ensuring the probity of the electoral process and overseeing the conduct of the political parties. The credibility with which it conducts its business is, therefore, central to political party development.

The structure of INEC is made-up of the Chairman, 12 Commissioners at the federal level and 36 Resident Commissioners with each presiding over a state of the Nigerian Federation of 36 states. One of the major weaknesses of INEC, which has generated negative feelings about its activities amongst politicians and citizens, is its composition (Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution 1999).

The 1999 Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution (FGNC) gave the President of the federation the powers to appoint the chair person, 12 Commissioners at the federal level and the 36 Resident Commissioners at the state level although such appointment must be rectified by the Senate (FGNC 1999). The danger in this arrangement is that where a ruling political party secures majority of seats at the Senate, the President's choice of candidates into INEC could easily be approved to support the interests of the ruling party at subsequent elections. This, in fact, has been the case with the ruling political parties, particularly in the Fourth Republic (Adegbamigbe, 2007: pp20–25). The fact of dominant party rule means that it is perceived to be strongly biased in favour of the interests of the incumbent ruling party. INEC was unsurprisingly consistently characterised as lacking credibility and political impartiality throughout the Fourth Republic elections (Egwu, Leonard, Matlosa and Smith, 2008)

The credibility and capacity of INEC to regulate party conduct was seen by both donors and parties as a key factor undermining political party development. All reports suggested the need to fundamentally restructure the INEC in particular with regard to ensuring its independence from the executive branch. This is central to political party development as well, given its potentially critical role in overseeing and regulating party conduct. It is unclear how deep the change that is likely to happen before the next election will be. According to Gberevbie (2014:p141), this constitutional provision that gave the power to appoint INEC chairperson to the President of the Federation has created serious doubt about INEC's credibility to conduct free and fair elections in Nigeria. Furthermore, the Justice Uwais' Report on Electoral Reforms (2008) pointed out that the classification of INEC as a federal executive body in Section 153 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria brings it under the oversight of the executive arm of government, making it improper to conduct free and fair elections.

In addition, the Justice Uwais' report observed that the funding of INEC through the executive arm of government renders it vulnerable to manipulation and undue influence by the Executive to the detriment of the 'opposition' during elections. According to Saliu and Lipede (2008: pp120–151), for democracy to thrive in Nigeria, the independence of INEC is a desirable requirement. They argue that the agency must not only profess to be independent, its transparency must be very clear to all politicians and the citizens to avoid a crisis of confidence in its actions before, during and after elections in the country.

International monitoring of elections became an important phenomenon in the Cold War era and, as one of the oldest forms of democracy assistance, is generally accepted around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, international election observers were present for 86% of national elections in 95 newly democratic or semi-authoritarian countries. Election observation has been particularly widespread in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, Latin America and Africa.

Three main forms of election observation includes:

- International observation of transitional or other exceptional elections conducted by missions sent by governments, multilateral organisations or international NGOs.
- Domestic monitoring by national organisations, especially non-partisan NGOs.
- International supervision by intergovernmental organisations of post-conflict elections. Here elections are conducted/supervised by internationals, not just observed (Rakner, Fritz and Menocal, 2007:p29).

Other variety of activities includes diplomatic engagement, support and advice on electoral systems, laws and regulations, assistance to establish legal electoral frameworks; general input to the national electoral commission, and support for electoral procedures ; such as party and voter registration, balloting, vote counting and dispute resolution, support to election administration and the training of election administrators, support to civil society in areas such as voter education, and the training of local observers and media monitors. Of the bilateral governments, USAID has had the most prolonged and consistent programme of electoral support. The Democracy and Governance Office of USAID also supports regional programmes of electoral assistance through NGOs such as the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), American party institutions, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) (Anyalebechi, 2022).

2. The Nigerian Legislature

The 1999 Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution vested the powers to make laws on the Legislature. The Legislature has the responsibility to enact laws both at the federal and state levels for the smooth conduct of

elections in Nigeria. According to Okoosi-Simbine (2007, pp 1–92), “ If Nigeria is to sustain democratic rule, one of the important institutions to pay attention to at all levels of government is the legislature, the organization through which citizen opinion acquires political significance in a democratic government.” The legislature, according to Heywood (1997), provides a link between the government and the people, a channel of communication that can both support government and help to uphold the regime and force the government to respond to public demands and anxieties. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2011) identified five major functions of the legislature as legislation, representation, Scrutiny and oversight, recruiting and training, and legitimacy.

However, as important as the function of the legislature in the realization of the democratic process of a nation, the Nigerian legislature is yet to enhance democratic practice and hence promote good governance in the country. Instead, legislature in Nigeria have dissipated so much energy on securing better conditions of service for themselves in cash and kind to the detriment of the people who elected them into office. For instance, Mkwugwo (2011 : p55) as cited in Gberevbie (2014, p.143) stated that the cost of maintaining each Senator for four years was approximately NGN3 billion or USD19.35 million and each member of the Nigerian Federal House of Representatives receives NGN 128.4 million or USD828,387 million as annual salary. Their fringe benefits include wardrobe allowance – 25 per cent of annual basic salary, recess allowance – 10 per cent; accommodation allowance – 200 per cent of basic salary; utilities allowance – 30 per cent; and domestic staff allowance – 75 per cent.

While justifying the military takeover of political power from the democratically elected government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari on 31st December 1983, General Muhammadu Buhari, in his maiden address to the nation, among others, said “...the situation could have been avoided if the legislators were alive to their responsibilities. Instead, they were preoccupied with determining their salary scales, fringe benefits and unnecessary foreign travels...” (Soleye, 2005, p.11–12). The above statement of General Buhari goes to support the argument that the legislature as a democratic institution in Nigeria failed in its role as a facilitator of democratic governance. Furthermore, the Nigerian legislature, in carrying out its legislative duties, amended Section 285(6) and (17) of the 1999 Federal Constitution of Nigeria in 2010 without foreseeing the future consequence of that particular section. The amended portions have to do with time frame for election petitions in the country which have to be disposed of within a maximum period of 180 days by the courts. Many people argued that election petition outcomes should be determined before people are sworn into public offices after elections, but the legislature turned it down, and supported the view that the ‘winner’ should take the oath of office while the case is handled by the judiciary for not more than 180 days (FGNC 1999). The implication of this development is that those declared ‘winners’ by INEC, fraudulently use state funds to prosecute their cases to the detriment of their accusers and the citizens as was the case in Edo, Ekiti, Ondo and Osun States (Adekeye & Ogunjobi, 2008).

Democratic assistance to parliaments has recently become a more dynamic field. Such can be approached as a rather ‘technical’ area of assistance, and one in which donor organisations, including officially ‘non-political’ ones such as the World Bank, feel able to engage alongside more politically oriented external factors such as USAID. Canada hosts the Parliamentary Centre (supported by CIDA), which has an extensive programme of workshops and seminars for parliamentarians and parliamentary support staff from all over the world. Department for International Development (DFID) one of the donors particularly active in Africa, has recently begun to engage more strongly with parliaments across the continent (Hudson and Wren, 2007, Anyalebechi, 2022). Assistance to legislators includes the development of procedural rules, support to develop parliamentary committees, capacity building of support structures for parliamentary work (secretariats), training in how to organise hearings, funding for research capacity, field visits, and consultations with civil society on various policy issues and so on.

The Consortium for Electoral and Political Processes (CEPPS) has been the cornerstone of USAID’s democracy and governance strategy in Nigeria, it is made up of three American NGOs namely the National Democratic Institution for International Affairs (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). USAID’s support to the national legislature is implemented by NDI. The main aim is to enhance the ‘efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness’ of the National Assembly by forging ‘progressive partnerships that integrate support, skills transfer, and technical

assistance to all members, key committees, National Assembly administrators, staff, executive officials, CSOs and citizens’.

3. The Nigerian Executive

The Executive branch of government is charged with the function of implementing or executing the laws and policies made by the legislature. This is the core of government as noted by Heywood (1997), because political systems can operate without constitutions, legislatures, judiciaries and even parties but they cannot survive without an executive branch to formulate policy and ensure that it is implemented. For instance, the Nigerian Constitution vested the power to appoint INEC officials on the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and also the power to release the fund required for INEC to operate. These provisions have created a serious crisis of confidence between the government and the opposition, to the extent that any election won by the government party is considered collaboration between the ruling party in government and INEC (Gberevbie, 2014, p.144)

The executive is the source of political leadership. More commonly, the term is used in a narrow sense to describe the smaller body of decision-makers who take overall responsibility for the direction and coordination of government policy. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2011) identified five major functions of the executive as ceremonial duties, control of policy-making, popular political leadership, bureaucratic management, and crisis management.

However, it has been observed that the executive arm of government has actually at one time or the other manipulated election outcomes in Nigeria through the deployment of state agencies like the police and the electoral body to its advantage during elections. Ikelegbe (2005: pp197–214), while advancing reasons for the failure of democratic governance in Nigeria, asserted that the 1983 general elections, like other elections in the country before it, were characterized by “incumbency manipulations of state agencies...announcement of fake results, repression of the opposition and imposition of the ruling party on the nation.” This note supports the view that the executive arm of the government failed in its role as facilitator of democratic governance in Nigeria. This implies that for democracy and democratic governance to thrive in a society, the executive as a democratic institution must play a role of an unbiased umpire because the executive arm of government is not a creation of a particular political party but of the constitution and hence should be supported by all, including those who may not be in the government -opposition’ for the time being if sustainable development is to take place in a country.

A major area of support for the executive arm of government from the donor agencies is diplomatic engagement. Major Western donors have always engaged at the highest levels with Nigerian candidates, political party leadership, civil society, business leaders and prominent individuals with the hope of promoting peaceful and credible elections. US, EU, UK and China employed diplomatic engagement strategy in the 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 general elections in Nigeria (US FACTSHEET, 2015). Such engagements were done through phone calls, private meetings, and public events in Washington and New York and by U.S. officials in Nigeria. For instance, President Jonathan promised President Obama in September 2013 that he would build on Nigeria’s democratic progress to make the elections in 2015 free, fair, and peaceful. Vice President Biden spoke to both candidates, stressing the need for a peaceful, free, fair, and inclusive election. The Secretary of State, John Kerry, visited Lagos on January 25 and met with both President Jonathan and Retired General Buhari, reinforcing the importance of their pledging publicly to refrain from violence. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, came to Nigeria and led the U.S. delegation to the Bi-National Commission Working Group on elections in February 2014. She even led U. S diplomatic elections observation in Abuja (US Diplomatic mission to Nigeria, 2015; Bariledum, Godpower, & Tambari, 2015). Also, the EC’s and other groups support for general elections has being implemented through the Financing Agreement between the EC and the Nigerian government. For instance, EU allocated EUR 40 million to support the Nigerian electoral cycle of 2006–2011. This funding was for a two-phase elections programme consisting of a pre-election/election phase (August 2006–August 2007) and a post-election/inter election phase (September 2007–2010).

4. The Nigerian Judiciary

Section 6 of the Nigerian Federal Constitution of 1999 vested the judicial powers of the Nigerian federation on the courts (FGNC 1999). The judiciary is empowered to adjudicate on the meaning of the law, in the sense that it interprets or constructs law. This function arises because the makers of law, that is, the legislators are

very often lay people as concerns matters of law. In countries with written/codified constitutions, the function of the judges also involves the interpretation of the constitution itself and this allows judges to arbitrate in disputes between major institutions of government or in disputes between the state and the individual. One of the chief characteristics of the judiciary in liberal democratic systems is that judges are strictly independent and non-political actors. To ensure the impartiality of court rulings, judges, whether appointed or elected, must have job security or tenure guaranteed by law, so that they can make decisions without concern over pressure or attack by those in positions of authority (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011).

However, the functions of the judiciary in the promotion of democratic governance in Nigeria have faced a serious challenge of crisis of confidence resulting from some of its judgments and pronouncements. This is particularly so in situations whereby the petitions of aggrieved candidates in elections are dismissed against the 'opposition' based on mere technicality rather than on the substance of the case in question (Justice Uwais' Report on Electoral Reforms 2008). Addressing Judges during the swearing-in ceremony of judicial officials who were the members of Election Petition Tribunals for the 36 states of the Nigerian federation in March 2011, the President of the Nigerian Court of Appeal, Justice Katsina-Alu warned the judges that:

In Nigeria, allegations of corruption have in recent past, placed the role of Election Tribunals in jeopardy...bear in mind that in most cases in this country when Election Petition Tribunals fail in their duties, the consequences have been violence resulting in murder, arson and grievous bodily harm (Akpeji, 2011 :pp1-2).

Commenting on the corrupt state of the judiciary on election cases in the country, the President of the Nigerian Bar Association, Joseph Daudu said:

We are no doubt aware that some of our colleagues, including very senior counsel and at times eminent retired judicial officers go about offering their services as consultants, particularly in election cases, for incredible sums of money, so as to act as conduit between their client and the election courts. The end result is to facilitate ready-made justice for persons they are acting for. We must strongly deprecate this practice...the existing rules of professional ethics can be amended to include such areas that will safeguard the dignity of the courts and integrity of the judicial process (Tsa, 2012, p. p7).

To buttress the corrupt state of the Nigerian judiciary, its negative effects on the country and the way forward, the Chief Justice of the Nigerian federation then, Justice Dahiru Musdapher said:

Reducing corruption in the justice sector would make it more likely that corrupt individuals in the other sectors would be prosecuted and punished. This would raise the cost of corruption and discount the rewards derivable there from. Thus, taking steps against corruption in the justice system should be a first step in dealing with corruption in society as a whole...We have started implementing a number of reforms...review of methods of appointment and elevation of judicial officials, and removal of unproductive judges from the bench. The purpose of all these initiatives is to set out the judiciary on a path of renewal so as to restore the integrity and dignity of the judiciary to its pristine status (Musdapher, 2012:p14).

5. The Political Parties

A political party is a group of people organised for the purpose of winning government power by electoral or other means. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (2011) identified nine major functions of political parties to be to recruit and socialise new membership; nominate and campaign to elect public officials; draw up policy programmes for the government if they are in the majority; offer criticisms and alternative policies if they are in opposition; mobilize support for common policies among different interest groups; provide structure and rules for society's political debate; enhance representation of the electorate; articulate interests as the citizens make demands to their governments and mobilize the citizens to participate in political and development processes (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2011).

However, according to Domingo and Nwankwo (2010:pp6-7) the formal institutional framework was noted as being problematic for political party development. First, all party candidates must compete through political parties (which eliminates the possibility of having independent candidates). But at the same time, the registration of political parties faces few real entry barriers. A party needs to register a copy of its constitution with INEC and, in principle, have inclusive membership, a headquarters office in Abuja and its internal rules need to be democratic. However, the enforcement of internal democracy is practically non-existent.

Second, all registered parties are entitled to state funding. This has led increasingly to the view that public funding of political parties should be eliminated in an effort to reduce the number of political parties. The view is that many of the parties would cease to exist if they did not have access to state funding for elections.

Third, despite the excessive fragmentation of registered parties, the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system encourages the consolidation of dominant party rule. It is in fact the main formal mechanism that limits access to elective office for the smaller opposition parties.

The formal rules, then, establish some constraints and incentive structures that impact on political parties. But parties in Nigeria are perhaps the product of informal institutions, guided by the phenomenon of 'godfatherism' and neo-patrimonialism, which operate within the power structures of a centralised oil economy in a regionally diverse society (Egwu, Leonard, Matlosa and Smith 2008; Zasha, Mustapha and Meyer, 2007). Moreover, there is a broad agreement that overall, the INEC has not been seen to enforce or implement the electoral act effectively. So, for instance, while the legal framework explicitly prohibits parties from retaining political militias or thugs, the high number of incidents of violence at polling stations indicates a lack of capacity and/or will on the part of the INEC and security authorities to police political party conduct and enforce this law.

6. Interest groups and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

These groups/organisations are another key element in a vibrant democracy. A citizen may be a member of a number of private or voluntary organizations and interest groups that try to influence public policy and sway public officials' views. Democracy protects the rights of 'special interest' groups to organise and advocate their causes. NGOs attempt to serve the needs of a community, a nation or a cause, and supplement or even challenge the work of government by advocating, educating, and mobilising attention around major public issues while monitoring the conduct of government and private enterprises. NGOs may provide expertise and personnel on the ground for the implementation of government-funded projects. NGOs may be politically unaffiliated or they may be based on partisan ideals and seek to advance a particular cause or set of causes in the public interest. Whatever their nature, NGOs operate under minimal political control of states (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011).

As an important actor in democratization, the civil society sector has benefited from democracy assistance. Since the beginning of third wave democratization, the CSOs have been widely acknowledged as an integral part of the democratization process. Civil society organizations are considered not just a major analytical paradigm, but a force or factor in the politics of developing countries. Therefore, the rising influence of the CSOs in African governance and development discourse is regarded as a significant milestone in the structuring of the political life of Africa (Uadiale, 2011). Their overbearing influence in building democracy has been also widely acknowledged. Brendler-Lindqvist (2007) argues that the civil society performs both countervailing and educative functions in a democratic setting. They balance power relations between the state and the market (the countervailing function) as well as foster democratic culture among citizens (the educational function). In this regard, the CSOs are important tools in building democracy. As a result, granting them aid encourages their active participation in the democratization process. Perhaps, this explains why the Swedish development agency, SIDA, maintained that the purpose of supporting civil society is to strengthen them as "a democratic actor" and as "an arena for civic engagement and organization (SIDA, 2004).

One of the darkest astrologies of Nigeria's democratic journey was the widely circulated misinformation by some scholars that the level of foreign democratic assistance rendered to Nigeria is very low and has not made any impact on her democratic consolidation effort and that Nigeria is self-sufficient financially in terms of funding the entire electoral process independently without relying on external donors' support compared to many other African countries (see Adetula, Kew and Kwaja, 2010; Bariledum, Godpower & Tambari, 2016; and Sule, Wurobokki and Sambo, 2018). The apologists of this assumption continued to refer to Nigeria's oil wealth.

Conclusion

This study has shown the roles of some democratic institutions in Nigeria towards promoting democracy from 1999 till 2021. This has shown that foreign assistance has made some important contributions towards the promotion and consolidation of democracy in Nigeria (particularly in the area of funding, training, provision

of technical skills and information to INEC, civil societies and political parties and election monitoring). By supporting independent media outlets, augmenting the capacities of civil society, reinforcing the electoral commissions, and strengthening legislatures and judiciaries, democracy aid aims to reinforce relationships of responsibility between citizens and their governments as well as between different government institutions. Without this aid, many of the key institutions and actors important for democratic consolidation would be much weaker.

This is evident of the progress of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. We have in this study identified democratic consolidation as a process and not a realization, analytically separated from the transition process. In this process, the nature of democratic consolidation in Nigeria has been characterized by the determination of the nation's political actors to squarely face the challenge of the mutability of democracy (see theory of change model). We have in this study identified some of the features of the progress made in democratic consolidation in Nigeria; within the period of focus of the study (1999-2021). We have examined the nature of the attendant challenges that have made it difficult for donor agencies to achieve complete consolidated democracy and made some far-reaching recommendations on how to enhance the chances of democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

Though Nigeria counts on the international community, democratic consolidation ultimately rests with Nigerians. Citizens whose lives and fortunes depend on democracy must accept and bear the responsibility for its survival. Democratic reform ultimately depends on citizens to make choices, frame options and initiate changes. Only Nigerian citizens who live with the painful realities of failing democracy —can break the cycle of terror, poverty and mediocrity that keeps them subdued. While agreeing that external actors and forces can, and indeed do influence internal political developments within a country, and therefore, can influence democratic transitions, we emphasize that their role can only but be limited and should not be overestimated. It is emphasized, for instance, that democracy cannot be imposed from outside: it springs and grows from conditions within a country. The argument is that no matter how sincere and determined a country or an international organization may be in its efforts to institute democratic rule in another country, its impact and influence "are largely conditional on opportunities presented by domestic developments," and, in most cases its efforts can only partially affect the outcomes of transitions." Where domestic conditions do not conduce to democracy, the efforts of an external actor could completely fail to make any impact.

We conclude this study on the note that besides the poor strategy of emphasizing NGOs with little influence on state institution, the stakeholders especially the political elite is another factor that hinder effective utilization of foreign democratic assistance. Hence domestic factors undermine aid's impact. Despite these obstacles, Nigeria has enjoyed the good will of donors since its return to civilian rule in 1999. And it is unlikely that donors will discontinue their support for the promotion of democracy and good governance. Although, consolidating democracy is still some time very far away, particularly in terms of regime responsiveness to citizens and political empowerment of the public, the dismal general elections and the refusal of present and past administrations to reform INEC and other democratic institutions indicate that many of Nigeria's rapacious political elite are still working largely against democratic consolidation. Yet the public desire for 'dividends of democracy' has remained very visible throughout the country.

Recommendations

Having ensured systematic and logical explanation of the subject matter with the application of theory of change as a method for planning, monitoring, and evaluating initiatives the following recommendations were offered:

1. For democracy to be consolidated in the country, there is need for change in the value orientation of the political elite. The ideological bases of our political parties that facilitate political vagrancy must be altered. Besides, for democracy and democratic consolidation to thrive in the country, the principles of democracy must not only be imbibed but must also be deepened.
2. There should be a complete revitalization of democratic practice in Nigeria in such a manner that would leverage the potentials of foreign assistance for democratic consolidation.
3. The war on corruption must be pursued with vigour. Put differently, it must be pushed beyond political propaganda, intimidation and witch-hunting of political opponents. Government must muster the political will

to punish any corrupt public officer irrespective of his or her status in the society. In addition, legislation should be enacted by the National Assembly making capital punishment a penalty for corruption related offences.

4. Greater harmonisation and alignment in democratisation assistance is desirable. There is a considerable need for donors to promote harmonisation and alignment if democracy assistance is to become more effective. This remains a challenge, both within donors' individual programmes as well as collectively. Donor fragmentation and lack of alignment with country priorities tend to undermine already rather weak institutions, especially in hybrid regimes like Nigeria. This in turn has important implications for overall governance and state capacity, and ultimately for the effectiveness with which aid can be used in-country.

References

1. Abdullahi, A. (2015). Promoting Credible Elections in Developing Countries: International Development Partners and Civil Society Organisations in Nigeria. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 9(5), 190-199.
2. Adegbamigbe, A. 2007. Operation rig the polls. *The News Magazine (Lagos)*, April 16, pp. 20–25.
3. Adekeye, F. and A. Ogunjobi. (2008) Mimiko floors Agagu. *Tell Magazine (Lagos)*, August 4, p. 47.
4. Aderemi. A. (2005) 'Electoral Commissions and Construction of Democratic Rule in Nigeria: 1979 to Date' in Onu, G. and Momoh, A. (eds.) *Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria (Lagos: A-Triad Associates)*
5. Anderson, A (2005) *An Introduction to Theory of Change*. Harvard Family Research Project. Harvard Graduate school of Education. Vol. X1, No. 2
6. Anyalebechi, S. M (2022) *Foreign Democratic Assistance and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria's Fourth Republic*.
7. Appadorai, A (1968) *The Substance of Politics*. Oxford University Press.
8. Akpeji, C. 2011, March 22. Katsina-Alu warns corrupt judges, swears in polls tribunals. *Guardian Newspaper (Lagos)*, pp. 1–2.
9. Aluaigba, T M (2016) *Democracy Deferred: The Effects of Electoral Malpractices on Nigeria's Path to Democratic Consolidation*. *Journal of African Elections*. Vol. 15. No 2
10. Bariledum, K., Godpower, N. B., & Tambari, N. S. (2016). "Foreign Democratic Assistance to Nigeria (1999-201): The Nexus Between Strategy and Elections Results". *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration*, 14(1), 29-37.
11. Brendler-Lindqvist M (2007). *Receiving aid or promoting democracy? A critical study of the impact of aid on two civil society organizations in Zambia*" Unpublished M.Sc. Theses, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University.
12. Burnell, Peter (2000) *Democracy Assistance International Co-operation for Democratization*. Routledge. ISBN 9780714681443
13. Carothers, Thomas. 1999. *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ISBN: 0-87003-168-6
14. Clark, H., & Anderson, A. A. (2004). *Theories of change and logic models: Telling them apart*. In American Evaluation Association Conference. Atlanta: GA. https://www.Theoryofchange.org/wp-content/uploads/toco_library/pdf/TOCs_and_Logic_Models_forAEA.pdf
15. Diamond, L J (1994) *Toward Democratic Consolidation*. *Journal of Democracy* 5(3):4-17 DOI:10.1353/jod.1994.004
16. Domingo, P and Nwankwo, C (2010) *Review of international assistance to political party and party system development - Case study report: Nigeria*. Overseas Development Institute (ODI).
17. Egwu, S, Leonard DK, Matlosa, K & Smith, M (2008) 'Nigerian Elections Since 1999 and the Future of Donor Support', Consultancy Report to the UK Department for International Development, DfID, Abuja and London.
18. Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution 1999
19. Gberevbie, D. E. (2014). Democracy, democratic institutions and good governance in Nigeria. *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review*, 30(1), 133-152.

18. Heywood Andrew (1997), Politics, Macmillan Press LTD, London.
19. Holden, Barry (1974) The Nature of Democracy. Nelson’s political Library. The university of Michigan.
- Hudson, A. and Wren, C., 2007, 'Parliamentary Strengthening in Developing Countries', Overseas Development Institute, London, Report prepared for the Department for International Development (DFID)
- Ibrahim, J. & Garuba, D. (2009). Institutional Weaknesses and Electoral Mismanagement: INEC and the Direct Capture of People’s Mandate. In J. Ibrahim, & D. Garuba. (Eds.). The 2007 Nigeria Elections and the Subversion of Popular Sovereignty (73-126). Abuja: Centre for Democracy and Development.
- Ikelegbe, A. O. 2005. Democracy and democratization in Nigeria. In Ikelegbe, A. O. (Ed.), Politics and government: An introductory and comparative perspective, pp. 197–214. Benin City: Uri Publishing Ltd.
20. International IDEA’s 2018–22 Strategy, Section 2 of Annex B
21. Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
22. Musdapher, D. 2012, February 23. Ethics, integrity, corruption and the rule of law. Nigerian Compass Newspaper (Lagos), p. 14.
23. Okoosi-Simbine, A T (2007) Assessing the role of the legislature in a democracy : a case study of Oyo State House of Assembly N. I. S. E. R monograph series, no 1.
24. Oni, E. O. (2014). The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria, 1999-2007. International Journal of Politics and Good Governance 5(5.1).
25. Patricia Rogers (2008). UNICEF —Theory of change. Methodological Briefs. Impact Evaluation No. 2.
- Rakner, L., Menocal, A. R. & Fritz, V. (2007). Democratization’s third wave and the challenges of democratic deepening: Assessing international democracy assistance and lessons learned. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
26. Rodee, Anderson & Christol (1957) Introduction to Political Science. New York : McGrw-Hill Book Co. p 83. 655.
27. Saliu, H. A. and A. Lipede. 2008. Constraints of democracy in Nigeria. In Saliu, H. A., Jimoh, I. H., Yusuf, N. and Ojo, E. O. (Eds.), Perspectives on nation-building and development in Nigeria: Political and legal issues, pp. 120–151. Lagos: Concept Publications.
- Schumpeter, J. A. 1942. C
28. SIDA (2004). Swedish Development Agency Policy for Civil Society, SIDA policy document, Stockholm: SIDA.
29. Schedler, Andreas (1998) What is Democratic Consolidation? Journal of Democracy. John Hopkins university press. Vol. 9, No 2. Pp91-107
30. Soley, O. 2005. Democratic sustenance in Nigeria and the challenges of retired generals. Commemorative Lecture in Honour of Major General O. Popoola (OFR), Professor O. A. Ladipo (MON) and Otunba F. Lawal (MON), Recipients of year 2004 Nigerian National Merit Award. Ogbomoso: Osun State of Nigeria.
31. Tsa, G. 2012. March 3. Supreme Court upholds Okorochoa, Uduaghan’s election. Saturday Sun Newspaper (Lagos), p. 61.
32. Uadiale, M. (2011) The Role Of Civil Society Organisations In Democratic Consolidation In Nigeria: The Birth Of A New Order. In the International Journal Advance Legal Studies and Governance, 2(1), April 2011
33. Uwais, (2008). Report of Justice Mohammed Uwais Electoral Reform Committee. Lagos: Federal Government Printer.
34. Zasha, James, Abdul Raufu Mustapha and Ruth Meyer, (2008), “A Lessons Learning Exercise following the April 2007 elections in Nigeria”, JDBF-I Final report