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Arms Proliferation and Regional Security Problems: A Reflection of Insurgency in The Lake Chad Region

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Abstract: This study has carefully explored arms proliferation and regional security problems, a reflection of insurgency in the Lake Chad region. The increase in arms proliferation across Nigeria and the entire Lake Chad is no doubt the function of the availability of light and small arms proliferation, playing an undeniable role in perpetuating violence from criminal related activities and destabilising peace, development and security. This study is anchored on the Frustration Aggression theory. The secondary data collection method was adopted for the work; and the study revealed that there is a high level of arms proliferation in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. The porous state of border security in the Lake Chad region has led to arms proliferation in Nigeria and the States that make up this region. Arms proliferation takes place in Nigeria and the other Lake Chad States through multiple channels that include the States, illegal means, external support to insurgency groups in the region, from neighbouring countries to Lake Chad region, through cult groups, etc. Arms proliferation has so much affected development in Nigeria and the entire Lake Chad region. Finally, improving regional security in Nigeria and the entire Lake Chad region is a task that will require all stakeholders. Consequently, the study recommended containing the high level of arms proliferation in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region through all stakeholders; Nigeria playing an active role since it is the richest of all the States; control of the multiple channels of arms proliferation in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region; and efforts should be directed to boost development in the Lake Chad.

Keywords: Arms Proliferation, Regional Security, insurgency, Lake Chad region, Frustration-Aggression theory, Porous Borders, Development.

Introduction

The arms proliferation poses serious challenges to both international and national security, especially in most of the developing countries of the world to the extent that some are losing their traditional monopoly over the control of the instrument of violence, which often leads to security problems. Obasi (2003) defines arms proliferation as "the spread of weapons from one group of owners and users to other; this he elaborated could be vertical as in the case of different actors within states already possessing particular weapons, or lateral where the acquisition involves a spread to states not previously possessing them". Arms proliferation is facilitated by certain intermediaries based on legal or illegal demands coming from particular lawless or restricted environments. The Geneva-based organization, Small Arms Survey, maintains, that "SALW do not proliferate themselves … rather, they are sold, resold perhaps stolen, diverted and maybe legally or illegally transferred several time. At each juncture in this complex chain of legal and illicit transfer, people-brokers, insurgents, criminals, government officials and or organized groups are active participants in the transmission" (Ocheche, 2002, p.3).

Regional security problems could be described as security-threatening situations that affect a given geographical space at a given period of time. For instance, we have regional security problems in the Middle East, Niger Delta, Northeastern Nigeria, the Lake Chad region etc. Whenever security problems are limited to a given area, it could be addressed as regional security problem. Given the foregoing, it is proper to say that the rate of arms proliferation in many parts of the world, and particularly in the Lake Chad region, has been difficult to estimate and much more difficult to control. Most governments do not publish statistics on transfer of small arms; and worst still are private companies who are highly secretive about arms deals. Much of the trade is carried out through black markets and other illicit transfers.

Ocheche (2005) explains that African States witnessed the most destructive and violent conflicts at the tail end of the 1980s and 1990s as a result of the excessive arms proliferation. For instance, the genocide in Rwanda, the almost decade long conflict in Liberia (1989-1997), the Sierra Leone crisis, the bloody crisis in

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the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the conflict in Mali have all demonstrated the extent to which arms proliferation is causing havoc on the continent. In assessing the African region in the third quarter of the twentieth century, Arlinghause (1984) did not hesitate to conclude that in Africa, "Development is security and security is development". Indeed there are several flash points that have remained so for a long while across the African continent, with the Lake Chad region and Nigeria in particular being a main reference point. What makes these flash points thick is the availability and widespread use of small arms and light weapons. Without these small arms and light weapons, conflicts and crises would not be prolonged as they have been in parts of Africa. The spread of small arms and light weapons and its degree of proliferation has reached an alarming proportion especially in the developing world of Latin America, Asia and Africa that the weapons have now come to undermine the stability of most of the countries of the developing world directly and indirectly.

Nigeria is one of the frontline victims of prolonged internal strife occasioned by small arms and light weapons diffusion. Due to the proliferation of arms and weapons like rifles, handguns (pistols and revolvers), shotguns, submachine guns, machine guns, locally manufactured guns, machetes, jack knives, rocket launchers, light mortars and other man portable systems etc, Nigeria and the entirety of Lake Chad region no longer observe peace. This situation has prompted a lot of cultism and other criminal activities such as kidnapping, raping, armed robbery, political thuggery, and communal conflicts. There is no doubt that development does not thrive in an atmosphere of conflicts, bitterness and rancour.

Arms proliferation in Nigeria and the entire Lake Chad region has reached an alarming rate. Today, governments of the states in this region cannot estimate the amount of small arms and light weapons circulating around them. How these weapons become available to the youths in these countries and the repercussions of the life lingering armed conflicts on the development of Lake Chad region and particularly Nigeria has remained a much talked about issue.

The impact of arms proliferation is felt in terms of loss of lives and high level of insecurity in Nigeria and Lake Chad region. The loss of property and human lives escalates the problem of poverty and deprivation of the affected population. Through the death of family members, arms induced conflicts lead to a deep fracturing of kinship and family structures. Due to arms proliferation, there have been many conflicts observed in Nigeria (like in the Northeast and the Niger Delta region), and many children have been left without parents, and women becoming widows. When a family unit is dismantled, children suffer and their future wellbeing is often bleak, as they are denied good parental care (Osimen, Akintunde and Bamidele, 2015). Many of these children end up as social miscreants who contribute to violent crimes. Thus, for every person killed or injured as a result of arms proliferation and attendant conflicts, there are many more who must cope with the psychological, physical and economic effects that endure in the aftermath. In this context, women and children are invariably the hardest hit. In recent times, arms proliferation in Nigeria and the entire Lake Chad region has led to an increase in violent crimes that undermine human security and development (Osimen, *et al.* 2015).

Arms proliferation in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region perpetuated by arms dealers, cultists, militants, and the military, has led to many problems in this area. Today, it is common sight to see very young children wielding arms, which further escalates the security challenge in the area of study. Obviously, arms proliferation has also affected the socio-economic life of the people. Businesses no longer thrive in many parts of Nigeria and the Lake Chad region today. Many prospective investors avoid this region due to arms proliferation that results in arms battles. It is against this backdrop that this study seeks to examine how arms proliferation leads to regional insecurity problems in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region; how the poor State of border security leads to arms proliferation in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, identify the sources of arms proliferation in the area of research and explore the extent to which arms proliferation has affected development in Nigeria and the entire Lake Chad region.

Conceptual Clarification
Arms Proliferation

There has been the prevalence of arms proliferation in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region for some time now, especially small and light weapons. Small arms and light weapons are not subject to any exact definition. The Encarta Dictionary in Usang, Ugwumba, and Abang (2014) defines small arms as "firearms that may be both carried and discharged by one person, as opposed to artillery weapons". By extension, the automatic

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weapons that developed from such firearms are also called small arms: Machine guns using the same ammunition as military rifles, as well as the larger calibre machine guns, are so classified. The term usually includes rifles, handguns (pistols and revolvers), shotguns, submachine guns, and machine guns.

The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of English Language in Usang, Ugwumba, and Abang (2014) describes small arms as firearms designed to be held in one or both hands while being fired. In the US the term is applied to weapons of a calibre of up to an inch (2.5cm). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines it as major weapons which are quite light, extremely durable and require little upkeep, logistic support and above all with minimal maintenance.

In the terminology of the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Usang, Ugwumba, and Abang (2014), small and light weapons include "all crew portable, direct fire weapons of a calibre less than 50mm and would include a secondary capability to defeat high armour and helicopters". Generally, small arms and light weapons can be carried in hand during combat.

The 1997 report of the United Nations Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms in Usang, Ugwumba, and Abang (2014) provides the most widely-accepted definition of small arms and light weapons. According to the Panel, the category of small arms include revolvers and self loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns; while Light weapons include heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifle, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket system, portable launchers of anti-craft missile system, and mortars of calibres less than 100mm. The Panel adds that Light weapons are not just small and less powerful variants of major weapons system, they are a distinct class of weapons with unique properties and advantages that distinguish them from other types of weapons. These distinctive features are low capital, availability, portability, minimum infrastructure, minimum training, conceal-ability, lethality and suitability.

 The NATO and UN Experts Panel definitions in Usang, Ugwumba, and Abang (2014) are adopted as the operational and working definition of all arms and artillery weapons is so vague, the various national military services have set arbitrary maximums on the calibre of the weapons regarded as small arms. Essentially therefore small arms are generally those weapons that are designed to be manned by individual combatants during combat and they include hand grenades, rifles and machine guns, while light weapons are those weapons manned by more than one person and include handheld rocket launchers, light mortars and other man portable systems.

For the purpose of this work, proliferation is construed to refer to excessive accumulation and illegal spread of weapons which could have a destabilising effect on a State. Those in government stock meant for responsible use by the military for the defense of the State and safeguarding of citizens constitute legal holdings. There are three broadly established and conventional modes of transferring arms. Legal transfer of arms conforms to all legal formalities usually from one State actor to another or their accredited agents. The second and third avenues are what have been dubbed grey channels or covert transfers. Grey channels, according to Pearson are arrangements by which "government officials look the other way as their agencies arrange for arms to be sent to foreign group and countries for profit, strategic calculation or both," while black market transfers involve "unlawful transfers by private arms dealers and smugglers" (UNDP, 2006).

Reflecting on arms proliferation in Nigeria, it is proper to say that gun possession by civilians in Nigeria is not new and predates colonialism. Guns were introduced by the Europeans prior to colonialism during legitimate and illegitimate (slave) trade between them and Africans. Subsequently, guns and other arms, ammunition and weapons were used by Europeans to realise their imperial ambitions when they used force to suppress Africa's resistance to European incursion, conquest and colonialism. The gunboat diplomacy was popularly employed by the British to compel African chiefs to enter into various treaties with them. There was establishment of West African Frontier Force (WAFF) used by the British which was used to execute the British-Aro War of (1901-1902), and other forms of resistance in Nigeria, West Africa, and Africa. The role of Royal Niger Company (RNC) later United African Company (UAC) backed by British Government in using force to suppress dissenting communities is imperative (Chuma-Okoro, 2011). These arms or guns possibly found their ways to the hands of Africans during the period of colonialism subsequently used in tradition and hunting in the rural community. In no time, guns and gun powder became symbols of strength and power, and were later transformed into ceremonial weapons displayed during funerals, burials, ceremonies

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and customary festivals among the natives. They also became symbols of individual and ethnic grandeur, and for deterring aggressors and invaders. Today, guns are no longer just ornaments of prestige, or just for hunting, safari and expedition. Guns have transformed in terms of functionality, lethality, sophistication, ubiquity and motive of ownership. They have become more weapons of criminality and instruments of the underworld (Chuma-Okoro, 2011). Ostensibly, the 1959 Firearms Act was enacted to check the increasingly high rate of arms proliferation in Nigeria towards independence. The failure of the Nigerian government to execute a comprehensive disarmament and arms destruction programme after the civil war (1967-1970) exacerbated the proliferation of guns and illicit arms trafficking. As at 2002, the number of SALW in Nigeria was estimated by various reports and studies at between 1 and 3 million including arms in lawful possession of members of the armed forces and the police and those (majority) in the hands of civilians. The 80% of SALW in civilian possession were illegally acquired because of strict regulations.

There is fear that a larger percentage of the SALW in circulation in Nigeria are illicit or illegal. Some of these illicit SALW were used in armed violence such as ethnic-religious conflicts, communal clashes, sectarian violence, cultism, political violence, electoral violence, vigilantism, militancy and criminality. Between November 2006 and February 2007, 212 cases of violent crime were reported, 189 0f these were carried out with firearms, 34 with other tools and two involved bombs (Chuma-Okoro, 2011).

Nigeria is a source/origin, transit and destination of SALW. The causes of the proliferation of SALW is well documented in the literature, for examples, crime, revolts, subversion, sabotage, religious crisis, communal conflicts, social agitations, micro-nationalism, insurrection, terrorism, insurgency, riots, militancy, electoral violence, political violence, social interest, ethnic tensions, cross border smuggling, porous borders, black marketeering, local manufacturing, privatization of security, insecurity, poverty, economic crisis, mass unemployment, among others. Some of the scholars focus on the supply side or push factors of proliferation of SALW like willing sellers, lucrativeness, and porous borders while others concentrate on demand or pull factors like crime, violence, conflicts, riots and unrests (Ayissi and Sall (eds), 2005; Florquin and Berman (eds), 2005; Vines, 2005; Hazen and Horner (eds), 2007; Chuma-Okoro, 2011; Nte, 2011). Out of the 640 million small arms circulating globally, it is estimated that 100 million are found in Africa about 30 million in sub-Saharan Africa and 8 million in West Africa, alone. The majority of these SALW about 59% are in the hands of civilians, 38% are owned by government armed forces, 2.8 % by police and 0.2% by armed groups. The gun trade is worth $4 billion annually, of which up to $1 billion may be unauthorized or illicit. Eight million new guns are manufactured every year by at least 1, 249 companies in 92 countries. Ten to 14 billion units of ammunition are manufactured every year enough to kill every person in the world twice over. African countries spent over 300 billion dollars on armed conflict between 1990 and 2005 equaling the sum of international aid that was granted to Africa within the same period. An estimated 79% of small arms in Africa are in the hands of civilians (Ibrahim, 2003; Nte, 2011). Between 1999 and 2003, there were over 30 communal clashes, sectarian violence and ethno-religious conflicts with each claiming hundreds of lives and properties, and internal displacement of women and children.

The proliferation and use of SALW in ethno-religious clashes and armed robbery have killed more than 10,000 Nigerians, an average of 1000 people per year since 1999. The majority of casualties about 66% in Kano riot of 2004 were SALW victims sustaining permanent disabilities. Injuries due to SALW have increased as much as ten-fold in urban Nigeria because most homicides are committed using SALW (John, Mohammed, Pinto and Nkanta, 2007; Nte, 2011). The problems of armed violence and proliferation of SALW are worsened by the inability of the police to reduce violent crime, ensure law and order and provide adequate security to the populace. None of the security agencies currently possesses the training, resources or personnel to perform their duties effectively due to lengthy and porous nature of Nigerian borders (Hazen and Horner, 2007). Nte (2011) posits that there is a direct link between the acquisition of weapons like SALW and escalation conflicts into a full-brown war.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is often one of the major security challenges currently facing Nigeria, Lake Chad region, Africa and indeed the world in general. The trafficking and wide availability of these weapons fuel communal conflicts, political instability and pose a threat, not only to security, but also to sustainable development. The widespread proliferation of small arms is contributing to alarming levels of armed crime, and militancy (Nte, 2011).

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The first small arms came into general use at the end of the 14th century. Initially they were nothing more than small cannon held in the hands, fired by placing a lighted match at the touch hole. Later a stock was added- the match lock and the first real handgun. Small arms are defined as smaller infantry weapons, such as fire arms that an individual soldier can carry. It is usually limited to revolvers, pistols, submachine guns, shotguns, carbines, assault rifles, rifle squad automatic weapons, light machine guns, general-purpose machine-gun, medium machine guns and hand grenades. However, it can also include heavy machine-guns, as well as smaller mortars, recoilless rifles and some rocket launchers, depending on the context. Large mortars, howitzers, cannons, vehicles and larger pieces of equipment are not considered small arms (Nte, 2011). African countries have experienced direct, indirect and consequential impacts of weapons proliferation.

Thousands of people – both civilians and combatants – are killed or injured every year on the African continent. Yet, even when death or injury is avoided, small arms proliferation and misuse can dramatically impact a community, country or region's landscape. The threat and use of small arms can undermine development, prevent the delivery of humanitarian and economic aid, and contribute to refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) populations (Nte, 2011). West Africa's regional superpower, Nigeria, continues to face serious challenges due to arms proliferation that is rampant in the country..

Inter-communal violence remains a serious concern. Since the end of military rule in 1999, fighting in several regions of the country has claimed thousands of lives. Plateau State in central Nigeria has been particularly badly affected (Vines, 2005). A long history of the militarisation of society has contributed to the problem of arms proliferation in Nigeria. The military has ruled for the majority of the period following independence from Britain in 1960. During the Biafran Civil War (1967–1970), large numbers of arms passed into general circulation. Civil–military relations have worsened since the transition to civilian rule in 1999, and most of the population see the armed forces and police as coercive and corrupt (John, Mohammed, Pinto, and Nkanta, 2007). SALW has been defined in different international and regional instruments, and also in national statutes. A common observation emerging from the different definitions is that the term "small arms and light weapons" covers a wide spectrum of weapons, their ammunitions and their spare parts. The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials of 2006, which is the West African sub-regional benchmark for regulating SALW defines small arms as arms destined for personal use and which include: firearms and other destructive arms or devices such as an exploding bomb, an incendiary bomb or a gas bomb, a grenade, a rocket launcher, a missile, a missile system or a mine. Revolvers and pistols with automatic loading, rifles and carbines, machine guns, assault rifles, light machine guns are also examples of SALW (Chuma-Okoro, 2011). Light weapons are the following portable arms designed to be used by several people working together in a team like heavy machine guns, portable grenade launchers, mobile or mounted, portable anti-aircraft cannons, portable antitank cannons, non-recoil guns, portable anti-tank missile launchers or rocket launchers, portable anti-aircraft missile launchers, mortars with a calibre of less than 100 millimeters (Chuma-Okoro, 2011). Simply put, arms proliferation has largely affected security in Nigeria and much of the Lake Chad region.

Border Security and Regional Security Problems

A proper knowledge of the concept of border security and regional security problems can only become clearer with our getting to know what a border is in the first place. Due to its dynamic nature, the concept of border is constantly changing. Border has been conceptualized by different scholars, international, regional and sub-regional organizations, in relative ways. In the meantime, the dominant definition has been geographical, independent of all that the concept of border encapsulates; and it would appear that in recent past, there has been a widening of the concept that extends beyond the traditionally accepted meaning of the border (Wilson and Donnan, 2012). As a result, borders give room for new meanings intermittently, as much as it allows for proliferation of types: diffuse or firm borders, juridical-political borders, territorial or identitary borders, cultural borders, symbolic borders, etc. Garcia (2006) cited in Jimenez, Orenes and Puente (2010) that identify eight dimensions of borders, which are the historical dimension, the spatial-cultural dimension, the dimension of ideas, the normative dimension, the economic, material, human dimension and the agential dimension.

Osimen, Anegbode, Akande and Oyewole (2017) expatiated on border security being a factor of border management. International borders are a security issue for all governments. States are recognized under international law by their capability to maintain their boundaries, secure their territories, and protect their

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citizens. The ability to secure national borders is one of the criteria used to classify states as strong, weak and failed. A State has a primary responsibility of protecting its citizens from both internal and external threats to their livelihoods. It must be pointed out that the strategic location of a country determines opportunities for illegal activities (like arms proliferation for one) that exist or can take place in its border areas. Some countries are more threatened by insecurities or mismanagement of other countries borders than their own. Border security means different things: border control, border management, border monitoring, border protection, etc. Usually, border security has been used to mean border control, which seeks to facilitate or limit the movements of people, animals, plants, and goods in and out of a country. The perceptions that a government/state has of external threats/risks determines its responses to border insecurity and the border management system it puts in place. In other words, how a country/state/government manages its borders reflects its fears and comfort.

Indeed, border management is an expression of a state's sovereignty. A state's failure to secure its borders can undermine its domestic and international legitimacies. The legal status of a state/government depends on how it secures its borders. The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933 identifies four criteria for state sovereignty: permanent population; a defined territory; a government; and the capacity to enter relations with other states. In other words, territoriality is equal to sovereignty; citizenship is defined by territory; territory is defined by borders; borders enable countries to engage in international relations; and borders define state-citizenship relationship (Osimen, Anegbode, Akande and Oyewole, 2017).

Border security problems are global concerns. Border security measures are border control policies adopted by a country or group of countries to fight against unauthorised travel or trade across borders, to limit illegal immigration, combat transnational crime, and prevent wanted criminals from travelling (US Department of Homeland Security, 2018).

Border security has attracted profound attention in many countries. In the United States of America, it is pursued in order to stop illicit smuggling of goods that are prohibited and deemed illegal from entering the United States. The European Union also offers a positive indication of how improved border related trade controls can contribute to both security and economic development (Andrews, 2007). Nigeria has her own share of border security challenges, which are made more complex by poverty, lack of good governance, corruption, chronic armed conflict, armed banditry, porous border security and transnational crimes (Olomu, Alao and Adewumi, 2019).

Border security is usually the responsibility of specialised government organisations. Such agencies may oversee various aspects of border control, such as customs, immigration policy, border security, quarantine, and other such aspects. Official designations, jurisdictions and command structures of these agencies vary considerably, and some countries split border control functions across multiple agencies.

Border security is a factor of border management. International borders are a security issue for all governments. Border security and the management of borders in ways that promote national security has generally been given low priority in Africa and Nigeria in particular compared to security provided for political elites and their assets in the national capitals and other urban areas far-removed from the borders. While national security strategies of the country are left to suffer. The negligence of border security and poor, border management in African States has largely contributed to a prevalence of threats such as cross-border crimes; Nigeria border security issues are distinctive, when compared to the other countries of the world. Because of this fact, these borders are not monitored, patrolled or controlled. Consequently, these borders have become transit points for smuggling and other illegal cross-border activities (Adejuyigbe, 2016). In other words, most, if not all, borders in Central and West African States are transnational crime zones. The conundrum of national security in Central and West African States has been compounded by the porous nature of their borders. When borders cease to function effectively, different forms of crimes prevail and the security of a state or region is put in serious jeopardy because borders constitute the most visible sign of the sovereignty of a State on its territory. Border security is therefore crucial to a State's involvement in the protection of its population against what it considers as threats ranging from migration, international terrorism, and multiform trafficking as in human beings, drug, raw materials or SALW (Jihan and Cédric, 2010). Interestingly, Central and West African States' border points no longer perform their strategic functions but serve as channels for smuggling of all sorts of illicit materials into the country. The current security challenges in a country like Nigeria where the nation's northern borders with Niger and Chad witness the unrestrained incursion of armed bandits to terrorise innocent citizens in towns and villages on the Nigerian side of the border calls for the need to put in place a

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rather effective border control system (Makka, 1989). Some key issues that plague border security in Nigeria much like other Lake Chad States include human trafficking, arms smuggling and proliferation, drug trafficking, smuggling of contrabands etc (Ogene, 2013).

Generally, some factors that plague border security in Nigeria and other West African States include the following factors:

i. Lack of political will and commitment of resources to effectively manage borders.
ii. Lack of cooperation within departments, between departments and between countries.
iii. Inadequate personnel available for deployment on the borders.
iv. Inadequate skills of personnel deployed to manage borders.
v. Poor motivation among border personnel.
vi. Lack or poor intelligence sharing between agencies and countries.
vii. Lack of facilities and equipment to secure and manage borders.
viii. Lack of office spaces and accommodation for border patrol and control personnel (dilapidated houses with collapsing walls and leaking roofs).
ix. Poor and inadequate communication channels — most of the border management personnel do not have the basic communication means such as radios or even mobile phones.
x. Lack of transport and roads along borders to enable patrols.
xi. Poorly controlled and managed border points due to absence of offices.
xii. Poorly demarcated borders; as pointed out above, more than 75% of African boundaries are poorly marked or unmarked.
xiii. Illegal border crossing points, usually called "mice or rat routes," are used by smugglers who charge a fee ranging from $15-100 depending on the difficulty of terrain and presence of border security personnel.
xiv. Porosity of borders: "The porosity of the land borders is perceived by some as a danger and vulnerability, but for the borderland communities it is an essential part of their very mode of transnational existence, of their social and economic life and of the cultural uniqueness that conform to their identity and livelihoods.
xv. Presence of cross-border communities that are difficult to administer and often uncooperative in managing borders. Some borders, particularly in Eastern African, have become almost unmanageable due to the lifestyles (gun culture) of pastoralist border communities.
xvi. Lack or non-functioning border commissions.
xvii. High-level corruption, most of the border security. Many of the security officers have been accused, such as immigration officials of selling passports to foreigners and police of fleecing passengers at checkpoints (Afrika and Ajumbo, 2012).

A border provides a practical opportunity to assist a state to maintain its internal security against external threats and aggression against its territory and people. A border is subsequently, a separation between states but also a process of control on behalf of their national security. Nonetheless, demands made by the current global economic system require a certain degree of border openness. Hence, borders should not just be exclusive (refusing entry to undesirable products and people); they should also be inclusive (facilitating the movement of individuals and goods). It is, therefore, important that states find a balance between the need for mobility and control between "doors and walls". A completely closed border is not in fact the solution to border insecurities and other transnational challenges. On the contrary, it would be in danger of creating an environment that is propitious to illicit activities. The balance between "doors and walls" should therefore be respected, to facilitate development of legal, economic activities in and beyond the border region and subsequently help reduce the conditions that generate illegal activities (Barka, 2012).

At independence, most of the African nations' artificially designed borders generated several controversies, such that on May 25, 1963, the OAU in Cairo had to compel African nations to sign documents maintaining the territorial boundaries handed to them by their colonizers (Zoppi, 2013 and Munya, 1999). The decision of OAU, now AU, came from the fact that most colonial boundary delimitations in Africa were full of errors. This boundary delineation error was not unnoticed before and even after the United Nations was established in 1945 to maintain international peace, friendly relations among nations and ensure self-determination of peoples or nations (The UNCharter, Chapter I, Article I). In fact, it can be said that since the

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United Nations could do more or less little about boundary errors, it had to shift the responsibility to the AU to ensure that African Nations maintain colonial-created boundaries to a void complications.

Presently however, the United Nations is faced with a serious problem of maintaining international peace between some African countries in dispute over boundaries. Again, an argument against the organization is that it has arrested inter-state wars, but has failed to end intra-state wars, namely insurgency, secessionist movements, terrorism, land or boundary conflict etc. Cases of boundary in Africa alone are a sizable workload that the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, called International Court of Justice, is trying to determine. Sumner (2004) shows that the cases of borders between Burkina Faso and Mali, submitted to ICJ in 1983 are still pending. Also, Somalia and Kenya Maritime Boundary Delimitation into the Indian Ocean, Ghana and Ivory Coast border, Tanzania and Malawi colonial border dispute are still pending at the ICJ.

However grievous the effect of colonial borders may be in Africa, there is the understanding that changes in boundary functions might lessen boundary tensions across borderland and border (Stephen, 1959). Initially, borders were barriers by which a state defends its sovereignty. Brunet-Jailly (2009) notes that the European states turned their borderlands into military regions where combat was rehearsed regularly and eventually took place. He also added that borders were originally used to delimit the territorial possessions of sovereign states, which made rulers who were eager to picture the boundary line demarcate their possessions. In Africa, precisely West-Central African States such as Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Benin, borders are used for the purposes of goods and services import and export, checking migration flows, as well as defending states.

Basically, the construction of borders in Africa was fundamentally to enhance trade, economic and political relations of the European countries. Nevertheless, the construction today appears to be frustrating its desired purpose. Borders are now more like barriers rather than bridges, and as such it frustrates trades even among countries with the closest borders. In relation to this claim, OECD (2005) recognizes that borders' inefficient procedures are barriers which may likely led to poor export, competitiveness, or make countries less attractive to investment in, in the face of smuggling, fraud and national insecurity. It is vital at this juncture to observe that no country in Africa is absolved of inefficient border procedures with complex trade facilitation. There is a cogent need to make policies that would make borders bridges and not barriers to reduce issues of insecurity, in particular, and smuggling. Spill-over effect of cross-border insurgency on the Lake Chad Basin Region has left enough workload for the people of that region to this day.

Running to safety is one of the basic moves that people embark on during a disaster, crisis, violence or war. The migration flow of people who are affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, crossing into neighbouring countries' border communities is today an alarming humanitarian crisis. United Nations (2015) declares that Boko Haram attack has overlapped into regional crises in other countries in Central African Republic, such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The agency also notes that significant numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons are adding pressure on host communities that are already food insecure and fragile. It is interesting to know that international agencies and regional organizations such as UN, AU, and ECOWAS, are showing great concerns to arrest the Refugees and IDPs crisis that accompany the Boko Haram insurgency. Their concerns can be associated with the fact that Boko Haram is now a regional and global challenge.

From the moment of declaring the Boko Haram as a terrorist group due to its level of attacks and strategies, which attracted a high response of counter-insurgency from the Nigerian Army and international communities, the number of Refugees and IDPs became increased especially across border communities in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. UNHCR (2012) estimates 8,806 Refugees who are Nigerians as its total population of concern in 2011. In the same vein, Barna (2014) observe that since 2010 more than 15 000 people have fled as a consequence of the Boko Haram attack. The number of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria and across her borders in the Northeast is currently very high. UNHCR (2016) notes that in 2015, the Lake Chad Basin Region witnessed increasing waves of violence from the Islamist terrorist group Boko Haram, who expanded its insurgency from north-eastern Nigeria, where to date over 2.2 million people are internally displaced, to neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger, killing there over 550 civilians and uprooting some 195,000 people.

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When one says that the humanitarian crisis in the countries that Boko Haram has extended its campaign and violence is quite alarming, it is taking into account the increased number of people who are killed or displaced, stripped of livelihoods which include loss of or lack of access to socio-economic activity as well as other valuable properties. Talking about the challenges that Refugees and IDPs are suffering from in the border communities of Cameroon, Niger and Chad, who are hosting over 215,000 Nigerian refugees, they are daily challenged with lack of security, shelters, heath, food, water, nutrition, and education etc. UNHCR (2016) remarks that Nigeria's 2016 Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP) advocates for the needs of nearly 285,000 Nigerian refugees who are in host communities, in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Earnestly, life for the border communities is not what it used to be with the expansion of Boko Haram to their areas.

The challenges that Boko Haram insurgency has instigated for the border communities are so enormous. From the amount requested to meet the need of Refugees and IDPs from Nigeria to Cameroon, Chad and Niger, it cannot be difficult to apprehend the precarious conditions of the countries. According to Reliefweb (2017), Regional Refugee Response Plan 2017, launched in Yaoundé, on December 16, 2016, involving 36 partners (UN agencies, national and international NGOs), has appealed for approximately USD 241 million for a target population of over 450,000 people (refugees, host populations and displaced persons). In addition, the sectors that have been identified to be greatly of concern include protection, education, food security, health and nutrition, livelihoods and the environment, shelter and non-food products, water, hygiene and sanitation.

Really, overspill effects of Boko Haram insurgency is a serious challenge for the Cameroonian government, even as it plunged the entire country into a sudden and unplanned for humanitarian crisis. As the government increases her effort to curtail the Boko Haram crisis particularly through the strengthening of its region security in the border areas, she has come under attack of gross human right violations just as Nigeria military or government was questioned on the same allegation in 2014. ACAPS (2016) specifically observes that on January 26, 2016, Nigerian civilians claimed that the Cameroonian troops killed at least 40 civilians around Gwadale border, who engaged in cross-border chase of Boko Haram members. But the Cameroonian government denied this claim. Indeed, it is challenging for a government military to be doing everything possible to ensure security, and again be confronted with allegations of human right violations.

Obviously, military and other security operatives are aware of their obligations as regards the rule of engagement in any operation to avoid harassment or death of innocent persons. For a reason of the allegation of human right violations made against the Nigerian military, which the Leahy Law of the United States prohibits, Nigeria was out rightly denied access to purchase US made weapon needed to fight Boko Haram (Tuku, 2014). Up till date, the Nigerian government is still trying everything possible to access US-made weapon, to effectively conduct her counter-insurgency against Boko Haram in the North-Eastern Nigeria. And yet the issue of government military forces and Boko Haram insurgents committing gross human right abuses is conspicuously a very big concern in the border communities of the Lake Chad region.

Theoretical Foundation

Any time the concept of 'theoretical framework' is mentioned in academic circles, certain questions become pertinent. The questions that rush to mind are: What theory do you want to use to guide your work? Who are the proponents or scholars that had done work(s) on this theory? What are the assumptions of the theory? How is this theory related to your work?

On the strength of the foregoing considerations, the theory that is to be used to guide this study is the Frustration-Aggression theory. Frustration-Aggression theory is one of the classic grievance theories in social psychology. It was first formulated by a group of researchers at Yale University. This theory was largely espoused by Ted Gurk. However, in 1939 Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears published their book "*Frustration and Aggression*". Ever since then, the frustration-aggression hypothesis has been the subject of much debate. Frustration–aggression hypothesis is a theory of aggression proposed by John Dollard, Neal E. Miller et al in 1939, and further developed by Miller, Roger Barker et al in 1941 and Leonard Berkowitz in 1969 (Dollard, 1939; Miller, 1941; and Berkowitz, 1969). Friedman and Schustack (1999) maintain that the theory says that "aggression is the result of blocking, or frustrating, a person's or a collective of peoples' effort to attain a goal".

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It is the assumption of this theory that the state of frustration leads to aggression which means violence. The frustration–aggression hypothesis attempts to explain why people <u>scapegoat</u>. It attempts to give an explanation as to the cause of violence. The theory, developed by John Dollard and colleagues says that frustration causes aggression, but when the source of the frustration cannot be challenged, the aggression gets displaced onto an innocent target.

However, this theory has some problems. First, there is little empirical support for it, even though researchers have studied it for more than sixty years. Another issue is that this theory suggests frustrated, prejudiced individuals should act more aggressively towards out-groups they are prejudiced against. However, studies have shown that they are more aggressive towards everyone (Friedman and Schustack, 1999). The theory also has limitations. For example, it cannot say why some out-groups are chosen to be scapegoats and why others are not.

<u>Green</u> (2011) explains that "the frustration-aggression hypothesis is an attempt to state a relationship believed to be important in many different fields of research. It is intended to suggest to the student of human nature that when he sees aggression he should turn a suspicious eye on possibilities that the organism or group is confronted with frustration; and that when he views interference with individual or group habits, he should be on the look-out for, among other things, aggression". This hypothesis is induced from common sense observation, from clinical case histories, from a few experimental investigations, from sociological studies and from the results of anthropological field work. Dill and Anderson (1995) explain that the systematic formulation of this hypothesis enables one to call sharp attention to certain command characteristics in a number of observations from all of these historically distinct fields of knowledge and thus to take one modest first step toward the unification of these fields.

Relating this theory to this study, it is proper to say that it will help us to be able to explore the factors that are responsible the frustration and aggressive behaviour of some militant and insurgency groups that resort to using arms to cause problems in Nigeria and the whole of the Lake Chad region. This theory was selected as the theoretical framework for this research with the hope that it would provide a deeper understanding about the psycho-social processes involved in the expression of frustration and aggression, which will immensely help us to understand the high level of regional insecurity in the Lake Chad region, and especially in Nigeria. And very importantly, it is through understanding the factors that induce frustration and aggression that we can better understand the phenomena of arms proliferation and regional insecurity with the cumulative goal of finding lasting solutions to solve regional insecurity problems in Nigeria and the entire Lake Chad region.

Situational Analysis
Arms Proliferation and Regional Insecurity Problems in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region

There is no doubt that a lot of criminal activities have been taking place along the borders of Central and West African States (International Organisation for Migration, 2019). Some of such crimes include proliferation and smuggling of small arms, recruitment of mercenaries and child soldiers, human trafficking, narcotics peddling, and Internet frauds/money laundering (Ado, 2006). Cross-border crimes contribute significantly to the destabilization of political, economic and social activities in the Central and West African sub-regions. Realizing the dangers posed by such cross-border crimes, the United Nations Security Council called on states in the regions to take a number of measures to address issues such as child soldiers, mercenaries and illegal arms trafficking. The call on these states to address cross-border crimes followed the UN Secretary General's Report of 12 march 2004 on West Africa and its recommendations to address the cross-border issues within a regional context and in a coordinated manner" (Collins, 2001). The practical recommendations the UN Secretary General suggested covered broad thematic issues such as security sector reform, disarmament, extortion, "naming and shaming" and the proliferation of small arms. He was of the view that, "The root causes of the region's problems [including cross-border crimes] … were linked above all to questions of governance, human rights and transparency. Regrettably, such abuses were all too prevalent in the region. Until they were addressed with real resolve, whatever inroads made in handling cross-border problems would remain temporary and fragile at best" (Collins, 2001).

Criminal activities are known and identified but responses towards addressing these crimes, both at the national and sub-regional levels, have simply fallen short of creating a secure, stable and peaceful environment for economic integration in West African States and particularly in the Lake Chad region (Tong, 2006). The

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crimes being committed are increasingly becoming sophisticated, and characterized by all kinds of actors across the political, economic and social divides. The loosely structured and complex modes of operation easily evade detection and enforcement measures.

Table 4.1: Categorisation of cross-border or Transnational Crimes in West Africa

Predominant Border Crimes	Country/Border Zones of activity	Group/Actors Involved	Transit States	Recipient States
Narcotics/Drug Trafficking	Cape Verde, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo	Narcotic/Drug dealers	Ghana/Togo/Benin/Nigeria	Spain, Portugal, UK, USA and South Africa
Internet Crime (Advance Fee Fraud/Money Laundering)	Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone	Advanced Fee gangs or syndicates/Wealthy business men or government officials	Syndicates commute from the western part of West Africa (Senegal) across to the eastern parts (Benin/Nigeria)	Nigeria and other countries where the 419 fraudsters are resident
Human Trafficking	All across West Africa but mainly around Benin/Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso	Traffickers who serve sometimes as middle men, trade and business partners	Mainly Ghana and Sierra Leone	Other West African countries, and in North America, Europe, and the Middle East
Fire Arms Trafficking	Ghana/Togo/Sierra Lone/Liberia/Guinea/ Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal	Rebels, local manufacturers of fire arms and middle men	Togo, Benin, Guinea-Bissau and Gambia	Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire
Recruitment of Child Soldiers, Mercenaries	Mano River states including Liberia/Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire	Rebel Groups (including LURD, MODEL, RUF, CDF, New Forces (MPCI, MPIGO & MPJ)	Same countries depending on where conflict spills over	Mano River States and Cote d'Ivoire
Smuggling of illegal goods, minerals and natural resources and cas crops	Cote d'Ivoire/Ghana/Togo/Benin/Nigeria/ Liberia/Sierra Leone	Individuals, businessmen and women, warlords/civil war combatants	Mainly Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire	In Europe and North America

Source: UNODC (Geneva) document on Transnational Organised Crimes in West Africa, New York, 2005.

Table 4.1 above clearly shows that there are lots of criminal activities that take place across the borders of West African States, which is exactly the case in the Lake Chad region too. Sadly, one of the pronounced criminal acts is fire arms trafficking, which helps in fueling conflicts in these states.

From the exposition that we have here, it is obvious that arms proliferation takes place across the borders of Lake Chad States. Some of such criminal activities, especially fire arms trafficking ignite some of the armed conflicts in these countries.

Poor State of Border Security and Arms Proliferation in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region

The porous nature of the borders of the Lake Chad region States have led to several arms being crossed their borders and thus escalating the spate of conflicts in them. It is however important to point out that in

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spite of the fact that virtually all these countries have their respective internal arms conflicts, the sect that has been terrorising these states has remained largely Boko Haram. Some of the atrocities committed by the sect can attest to the fact. They are as presented below:

Some arms related atrocities committed by Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad region include the following: On April 15 – 2014 Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping, 276 female students in Borno State are kidnapped by Boko Haram. On 17 June -2016, at least 24 people were killed and at least 10 injured after Boko Haram militants attacked a funeral Kuda, Nigeria. Besides, 7 people were killed and 12 injured after an attack on policemen in Ghafam, Niger. On 1 November -2016, nine civilians were killed when a car bomb exploded near a military checkpoint in Northern Nigeria in Gubio. 5th November 2016 saw an army officer and six soldiers being killed by Boko Haram militants in a gun battle in Borno State, Nigeria. On 11 November 2016, two persons were killed in an early morning bomb blast in the Umulari area of Maiduguri (Wikipedia, 2017).

The above data show that Boko Haram is a sect that has committed lots of cross border crimes with arms within the Lake Chad Basin region that comprises the states in this study. This reality calls for the need to permanently find a solution to the menace of Boko Haram if the states under study actually want to be arms conflicts free and pull themselves out of the present high level of underdevelopment.

Arms Proliferation and Effects on Development in Nigeria and the Entire Lake Chad Region

The problem of arms proliferation has largely affected development in Nigeria and the entire Lake Chad States. These countries have been grappling with issues of development since their independence to date. They are rated among the underdeveloped nations with the practical indices of underdevelopment being obvious and prevalent in them. They collectively have low per capita income, high unemployment rate, low human capital development, poor income, infrastructural decay and many other developmental challenges. Sadly, armed conflicts have turned out to be one of the greatest inducers of this condition in this region. For example, the activities of Boko Haram terrorism have been major catalysts of underdevelopment in Nigeria (Daily Trust, 10 March 2014).

Whenever education is affected in any state, development begins to see its progress severed from the bottom. Education is a panacea for national development across the world. There is no society that does not give adequate attention to her educational growth and development. Apart from the paltry budgetary allocation by the government in a country like Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgency has been an obstacle to educational development not only in Nigeria but also in the other selected states as their activities penetrate these other states. By implication, Boko Haram translates to war against western education especially in northern Nigeria and its environs. In Borno state the attacks had destroyed over 882 classrooms as of August 2013. In Yobe State all schools were shot from June to September 2013. On 6 March 2014, the Federal Government closed five Federal Colleges (Unity Schools) in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States, ordering their estimated 10,000 students to relocate to other schools (Daily Trust, 10 March 2014). Parents fearing attacks have withdrawn thousands of children from schools in a region already the most educationally backward in the country.

In a country that is struggling with educational infrastructure and qualitative manpower to improve on the standard and quality of education, the Boko Haram insurgency is further compounding its challenges through attacks on the few available schools, kidnapping of school girls, killing of students and teachers. Certainly, this is affecting adversely the present and future development of this country and the entire region. It will further increase the rate of illiteracy in the society; for it is an educated and enlightened mind that steers the ship of development. When the rate of illiteracy and school dropout is high, there is the tendency that violence will increase and persist in the society. In the states of Central Africa, armed conflicts have led to education being stunted (Straubhaar, 2006). These countries in the near future will run short of required manpower and informed citizenry to pilot their affairs and thus escalate underdevelopment. This in turn will increase tension and further increase the spate of armed conflicts in the states of study.

Our thesis is that armed conflicts attack on the educational sector will impoverish the economies of the countries understand in the nearest future. In northern Nigeria for instance, it is a calculated attempt to create a generation of uneducated youths in that region so that they can consistently have school dropouts and illiterates to recruit as suicide bombers and fighters (terrorists).

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Economically, terrorism wrought by armed conflicts that flourish on the shoulders of porous borders have in no measure contributed to the economic backwardness of these regions that are attempting to reposition her economies to meet the 21st century economic challenges and overcome poverty. Poverty rate is very alarming in these regions. But in recent years, especially in northern Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgency has doubled the poverty rate.

Aro (2013) points out that the economic effects of armed conflicts in Central African Republic, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger can be generally viewed from two perspectives: they have effects on these states and individual members of the states and particularly residents of Border States or areas. Economic activities have been massively disrupted by Boko Haram insurgents and destroyed more than 25 telecommunication masts and base stations in Maiduguri, Potiskum, Bauchi, Gombe and Kano states, thus setting back efforts to improve telecommunications in the region (The Guardian, 12 September 2012). Isakpa (2011) in his view on the negative impact of Boko Haram insurgency on the economy opined that "there can be no real progress made in any economy that is hostage to security". In August 16, 2012 Boko Haram attacked Bornu State capital, Maiduguri and destroyed lives and properties. The Maiduguri incident affected businesses as traders closed their shops at the popular Monday Market as early as 11.am. Civil servants immediately returned to their homes crippling government business and robbery attempts were made at the popular Monday market (The Nation, Thursday, August, 16 2012). It must be noted that armed conflicts in Central African Republic, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria have led to people abandoning their businesses, closure of banks and government parastatals amongst other issues.

Aro (2013, p. 2) was quick to assert that, "Boko Haram insurgency has not only led to closure or abandonment of peoples business activities within the affected region but also led to immigration of people from the affected region as well as led to reduction of patronage of products from northern region because of rumour that Boko Haram strategists are planning to send poisonous products to other parts of the country. Also, the insurgency of Boko Haram has reduced drastically government developmental projects, investment and growth in private business initiatives in the affected places. No wonder 2011 World Investment Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade Development reported that lull in business activities caused by insecurity in Kano alone has cost the Nigerian economy N1.3 trillion (6 billion dollars) as a result of attacks by Boko Haram group (Aro, 2013). We have to recognize the fact that whenever the economy of Nigeria is affected, it equally affects those of the countries around it.

Furthermore, armed conflicts have discouraged Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Central African Republic, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria. Investors all over the world are afraid of going to do business in armed conflicts infested areas. Countries on daily basis warn their citizens to stay off Nigeria and its neighbouring countries that have armed conflicts distorting businesses and tourism. This is a very bad signal to economic growth and development of these states. For instance, Nigeria with its vision 20:20:20 is projected to be world economic power by 2020, but with the Boko Haram insurgency, the economic future of Nigeria is bleak. With the discussed deleterious effects of this insurgency on the Nigerian economy and the huge resources being deployed by the Federal Government to fight Boko Haram, the development of Nigeria is at stake. Apart from the economic impact of armed conflict in these countries, they are also experiencing serious setbacks at the political level of governance. Armed conflicts have to a large extent paralyzed government institutions and also created an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust among the political class, which is not healthy for the development of these states.

Armed conflicts in these states have drastically reduced government performance in the area of infrastructural development, employment generation, and improved workers welfare amongst others. The current budgetary allocation to security and the increased security votes of governments have remained high. These huge capital investments to security concerns that should have been channeled to other issues in the education, health, agriculture and other sectors are being used to this awkward phenomenon.

Given what has been discussed here, it is proper and safe to say that the porous nature of borders that crate the room for arms to freely cross borders in the States of Lake Chad region has a high level of underdevelopment that, if checked and controlled can largely affect the developmental prospects of these countries.

Discussion of Findings

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A lot of empirical studies have been carried out in this area of research in the past by different scholars and authorities. The continued proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Africa have most definitely resulted in several consequences, some of which have been devastating and highly detrimental to the growth and development of continent and in fact threatened the existence of several States in it. Small arms and light weapons, of themselves, are not capable of causing conflicts and security problems, although Jekada (2005) argues that they are not merely symptoms of violence "because they also contribute to the intensity, duration and destructiveness of internal conflicts". However, the debate, acknowledged by Jekada (2005), "borders on whether the proliferation, accumulation and easy availability of weapons should be viewed as a sufficient factor in triggering violent behavior". Although small arms in most cases are as important as other root causes (permissive factors) in instigating internal conflicts, it is more accurate to include small arms and light weapons as part of the approximate causes of internal conflicts. The difference between the two types of factors, Jekada (2005) explains, is that while the existence of permissive conditions makes violence and insecurity more likely, it is the approximate causes that transform potentially violent situations into full-scale confrontations. Again, small arms and light weapons, in addition to playing a role in the initiation of internal conflicts, have arguably had more detrimental effects on ongoing conflicts and on post conflict peace-building and reconstruction.

Strohmeyer (1999) was of the position that the availability of small arms and light weapons may prolong fighting, increase human and material loses, reduce willingness of conflicting parties to find negotiated solutions to their disagreements, prevent international and non-governmental organizations from engaging in conflict prevention as well as management and resolution efforts, cause serious problems for the countries surrounding the conflict area, and even trigger interstate violence within regions, and much more, but it must also be mentioned that there are factors that overtime have led to the consequences which small arms have unfortunately sustained.

Small arms and light weapons are arguably, obviously, the cause of several protracted and prolonged conflict situations across Africa, but could they also be an effect of a continent founded on conflict and violence? The sources of small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation in Africa are varied and dynamic. Edeko (2011) observes that they range from the manufacture and supply of new weapons both inside and outside the continent, to the remnants of weapons shipped into Africa in the 1970s and 1980s by the former Soviet Union, the United States, and their allies to facilitate different interstate and intra-state proxy wars.

The violent protests and struggles against colonial rule as well as the acts of pacification and suppression of these protests with the use of weapons; the years following the independence of the African continent and the continued efforts of Europe to remain relevant in the politics and economy of Africa has greatly propelled the transfer of illegal arms across time and space in Africa and particularly in Nigeria. Through efforts of military aid and interventions, peacekeeping operations, as well as other similar conditionalities, non-estimated small arms and light weapons, have gained access into several States on the continent and have continued to proliferate among individuals, especially rebel groups, terrorists and other non-State actors, and have continued to inflict untold harm on other civilian population, especially women and children, as well as the Nigerian State in particular and the continent in general.

The long years of colonial rule and the authoritarian nature of rule promoted by these colonial administrations in Africa have left a political legacy of authoritarian rule on the continent; the psyche of Africans have been negatively confined to a trend of independent authoritarian regimes and leadership styles across the continent, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, until recently, are all cases in point. The corruption, unaccountability, non-representativeness and the other ills that characterized colonial rule have remained for several decades after independence. The several years of defective military regimes across Africa have also adversely affected the nature of leadership on the continent. These leadership trends have led to wide oppositions and resistances from the African people, resulting from gross exclusion of groups from development processes, declining standards of living and poorer wage levels, increasing unemployment rates, increasing poverty, among others; insurgent groups have resorted to arms in order to be heard, and have been infiltrated by other criminal and terrorist groups, unleashing mayhem and insecurity on both the government and citizens of several nations on the continent. The small arms and light weapons problem is not connected

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only with the wider problem of violent political disputes within States, they are also the main tools of violence for criminals operating either on a national or transnational basis (Krause and Williams, 1997).

The United Nations Security Council in 2003 also captured the position above in the assertion that *"the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the phenomenon of mercenaries pose complex challenges to West Africa, involving security, humanitarian and development dimensions. The upsurge in intra-state conflicts and violence has created a staggering demand for small arms, and has contributed to the continued proliferation of bandits, rebel groups, mercenaries, uncontrolled police and militia in the entire Lake Chad region (and in fact the continent at large). Hence, it is safe to conclude that arms proliferation is both a cause and the effect of insecurity and declining State capacity in Africa, which is particularly the case in Nigeria.

According to Kerry and Hyunjoo (2007), "armed crime, banditry, urban and pastoral violence, cattle rustling, poaching and trafficking are the common arms proliferation problems in Kenya". Armed violence is found most frequently in the pastoralist and cross-border areas in the North Rift, north-eastern and parts of the eastern and coastal provinces. Kenya's lack of capacity at and in between border checkpoints, as well as proximity to countries experiencing varying levels of conflict, contributes to a steady flow of arms in and out of the country. Similarly, Kiflemariam (2002) argued that, small arms and light weapons play a significant role in determining the winners and losers of conflicts, and in the commission of crimes. Other than legitimate use for security management, misused or illicitly transferred small arms have only had negative effects on the communities affected and largely affect innocent people. They increase the severity of conflicts and extend their duration. One of the major impacts of illicit small arms and light weapons is the displacement of people, which is not only confined to hotspots of electoral violence in the central Rift Valley.

Research in northern Kenya indicates that small arms and light weapons fueled pastoralist violence had displaced more than 160,000 people by 2003. In two years, at a given period of time, more than 200,000 people had been internally displaced by small arms and light weapons fueled conflicts over resources or livestock (Adan *el at.* 2003). In the North Rift area, insecurity as a result of the prevalence of small arms use has fed a gun culture that has undermined entrepreneurial development and investments while contributing to cases of sexual violence (Kamenju *el at.*, 2003).

There are no figures available on the exact number of small arms related deaths and injuries in the Great Lakes District and Horn of Africa. However, it is clear that the region has been hard hit. Small arms and light weapons have been the main weapons used in both recent wars between States and domestic conflicts, including the civil wars in Burundi. In the massacre in Gatumba in Burundi, for instance, 150 people were killed in 2004.

The history of uncontrolled small arms and light weapons in Tanzania dates far back as early 1960s during the cold war period. As a result of this, proliferation and the possession of illegal small arms and light weapons have been a security challenge to individuals and nation in Tanzania. Small arms and light weapons have negative impact on social security of the people in the country. People are dying, suffering and developmental activities are affected. In fact, the availability possession and usage of small arms and light weapons are associated with greater incidences of violent crime, murder, armed robbery, cattle rustling as indicated in the table below. Statistics indicate that the possession of small arms was used to commit various crimes in Tanzania (Maria and Ndimbwa, 2013).

The Uganda National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons report in 2006 stated that, Uganda is believed to have large stockpiles of SALW. According to the report, these stocks are held by the military, the police and other State security establishments, as well as the licensed privately owned arms. The report stressed that sizeable amount of the small arms holdings are in illicit possession, in the hands of insurgents, armed communities and criminals. It also confirms that the uncontrolled SALW has devastated lives and livelihoods, kill thousands of people in conflict, cattle rustling and criminal activities, thousands more are injured, terrorized, or are forced out of their homes into lives as refugees or internally displaced persons. Correspondingly, Kerry and Rhee (2007) mentioned that, Uganda has been one of the examples in which small arms can affect a State, illustrating as well the breadth of issues SALW programmes need to cover: from cattle-rustling and insurgencies, to post-conflict recovery, instability, conflict and involvement of armed Ugandans in neighboring States, weak borders, displaced and returning populations, weapons trafficking, banditry and crime, and livelihoods and tribal identities that rely on guns.

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The foregoing awkward scenario is the stereotype in much of the African continent, and particularly in Nigeria located in the Lake Chad region. Cutting across the North East, Niger Delta, the Middle Belt, in fact in all parts of Nigeria, there has been the unprecedented incident of arms proliferation. This situation has heightened the security problems in the country and thus spilled over to the entire Lake Chad region with grievous consequences.

Given what has been discussed above, this study has some findings which are as follows:

Hess (2016) posits that, "Explaining the meaning of the results to the reader is the purpose of the discussion section of a research paper". It is always proper to "remember that the focus should be to help the reader understand the study and that the highlight should be on the study data". The foregoing being obvious, some findings were made in the course of this study. One of them is that there is a high level of arms proliferation in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. This is evident in the high catchment of arms that have been gotten from the Niger Delta militants and the ones observed in use by the Boko Haram insurgency group and other militancy groups in the region.

The porous state of border security in the Lake Chad region has led to arms proliferation in Nigeria and States that makes up this region. With arms freely crossing the borders of these countries, there has been a spiral in the spate of armed conflicts in this region.

It is equally the finding of this study that arms proliferation takes place in Nigeria and the other Lake Chad States through multiple channels that include the States, illegal means, external support to insurgency groups in the region, from neighbouring countries to Lake Chad region, through cult groups etc.

Furthermore, it is the finding of this study that arms proliferation has so much affected development in Nigeria and the entire Lake Chad region. Due to the high spate of arms proliferation, many investors are leaving this region with attendant developmental consequences. Besides, the conflicts that the arms induce take much toll on the economies and developmental potentials of these States, which is clearly the case in Northeastern Nigeria due to Boko Haram insurgency.

Finally, it is the finding of this study that improving regional security in Nigeria and the entire Lake Chad region is a task that will require all stakeholders, including the international community support, to ensure that this region is purged of arms proliferation through proper policies and application.

Summary

This paper has carefully explored arms proliferation and regional security problems, a reflection of insurgency in the Lake Chad region. This brings to the fore the security implications of arms smuggling across the borders of the States of Central and West Africa especially in the light of how it has induced a high level of insecurity through the arms conflicts they cause. This study draws on the Frustration-Aggression theory as it is a theory that focuses on establishing a relationship between frustration and aggression that induces militants and insurgent groups to proliferate arms and cause conflicts in the Lake Chad region. The study finds that there is a high level of arms proliferation in Nigeria and the entire Lake Chad region, which has created the room for arms to freely cross these borders and thus spiral the spate of armed conflicts in these countries. Besides, Boko Haram insurgency has been observed to be the major source of armed conflicts in these countries and thus made this region very unsafe and affecting their economies as the political leaders in these states have not demonstrated adequate will power to fight the menaces of arms proliferation, porous border and armed conflicts in part reinforced by external forces. With perpetrators remaining unpunished, these region look like being doomed for a long time if appropriate measures are not put in place.

Conclusion

The high spate of arms proliferation has contribute significantly to the spiraling rates of armed conflicts in the States of Lake Chad region and thus led to the destabilization of political, economic and social activities in this region. Transnational criminal activities in the Lake Chad form the symptoms of larger underlying structural problems than the cause of insecurity. Realizing the dangers posed by arms proliferation and the consequent armed conflicts they prompt in African States, the United Nation Security Council called on States in West African sub-region to take a number of measures to address issues of border-crimes and security problems. This was a report of 12 March, 2004 on West Africa and its recommendations to address cross-border issues with a regional context and in coordinating manner. This paper therefore focused on the blue-

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print recommendations and other alternative options to address arms proliferation and security. Although some efforts have been made to prevent, control and possibly eradicate arms proliferation across porous borders in African States but these efforts have not succeeded in reducing the on-going regional security problems like in the Lake Chad. The on-going cases of small arms, drugs and human trafficking as well as smuggling of cars and other goods, call for more effective responses to the different categories of crime. In the light of this, the various international, regional and sub-regional legislations on the different crimes categories needs to be revisited and measures put in place to disseminate them towards their effective implementation. These proactive measures are sure to checkmate arms proliferation and border security situation and incidentally control armed conflicts in Nigeria and entire Lake Chad region.

Recommendations

The study therefore offers the following modest recommendations:

1. There is the need to contain the high level of arms proliferation in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region through all stakeholders in this region concertedly working assiduously towards ending this menace.
2. To control arms proliferation in the Lake region, there is the need for Nigeria as the richest of the states to spearhead strengthening of border control to checkmate the spate of arms crisscrossing them and thus causing insecurity in this region.
3. The States that make up the Lake Chad region should control the multiple channels through which arms are proliferated, which include State authorities, illegal means, external support to insurgency groups in the region, from neighbouring countries, cult groups etc.
4. Efforts should be improved to bring about development in the Lake Chad region that has been largely denied it through rampant arms proliferation by militant and insurgency groups for the progress of this area.
5. Making progress in the fight against arms proliferation will require a sense of unity by all stakeholders in the region for the central goal of ending this awkward phenomenon.

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